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I. INTRODUCTION
Although several cases decided by the United States Supreme Court
during the tenure of Chief Justice John Roberts (the “Roberts Court”)
have dealt blows to class-action litigation, it would be a mistake to
characterize the Roberts Court as generally hostile to class actions. Some
decisions have sustained class proceedings that many had thought dead
on arrival in the Supreme Court. And the Roberts Court’s recent
decisions on class certification in open-market securities-fraud cases
have been particularly agreeable to investors asserting class-action
claims.
Part II of this Article presents an overview of Roberts Court
decisions concerning class litigation.1 Those decisions are a mixed bag –
some are unfavorable to class litigation, and others are quite favorable.
With the exception of decisions applying arbitration clauses to bar class
litigation, however, the Roberts Court’s decisions are, on whole, not
particularly hostile to class proceedings. Some are remarkably favorable
– rejecting state-law bars to asserting certain state-law claims on behalf
of a class, for example; denying preclusive effect to federal orders
* A.B., summa cum laude, 1982, Ohio University; J.D. with high honors, 1985, Duke University
School of Law. A member of the California bar and partner in the law firm of Robbins Geller
Rudman & Dowd LLP, the author frequently represents investors as plaintiffs in class-action
litigation – including in several of the cases cited in this article. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (U.S. 2011); Dura Pharm., Inc., v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005); Fener
v. Operating Eng’rs, 579 F.3d 401 (5th Cir. 2009). From time to time he files briefs for amici curiae
in prominent securities class actions. See, e.g., Brief for Professors of Civil Procedure and Securities
Law as Amicus Curiae, Amgen v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (U.S.
2013); Amicus Curiae Brief for Employees’ Retirement System of the Government of the Virgin
Islands, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (U.S. 2011); Amicus
Curiae Brief for Mn Services Vermogensbeheer B.V., et al., Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, Ltd.,
130 S. Ct. 2869 (U.S. 2010); Amicus Curiae Brief for Change to Win and the Change to Win
Investment Group, Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (U.S. 2010); Amicus Curiae Brief for
Amalgamated Bank, as Trustee for the Longview Funds, Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division
Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2008); Amicus Curiae Brief for The
Regents of the University of California, Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th
Cir. 2006), vacated and remanded for reconsideration, sub nom. Avis Budget Group, Inc. v.
California State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 552 U.S. 1162 (2008), on remand sub nom. Simpson v.
Homestore.com, Inc., 519 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). The author is indebted to Joseph D. Daley for
reviewing a draft of this article and offering several very helpful comments.1.See
infra
text
accompanying notes 8-54.
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denying class certification; and rejecting contentions that a Ponzi
scheme’s purported investments in exchange-traded securities mean its
victims’ state-law claims are precluded by a federal law barring statelaw class actions based on false statements made in connection with the
purchase or sale of exchange-traded securities.2
The Article’s primary focus, however, is on a trilogy of Roberts
Court decisions concerning class certification in open-market securitiesfraud cases, where fraudulent statements allegedly manipulated the price
of securities traded in the open market: Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton, Co. (“Halliburton I”),3 Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds,4 and Halliburton Co. v. Erica P.
John Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton II”).5 Together these decisions are
remarkably favorable to plaintiffs seeking to proceed on behalf of a
class. Each construes and applies the Rehnquist Court’s 1988 decision in
Basic Inc. v. Levinson,6 which held that proving the reliance element of
federal securities-fraud claims will not cause individual issues to
predominate over common issues, so long as the securities in question
were actively traded and the allegedly false or misleading statements at
issue were publicly disseminated.7 Each rejects limitations on class
certification under Basic that had been imposed by some lower courts, or
that were proposed by defendants. And Halliburton II flatly rejects an
invitation to overrule Basic, a formerly controversial decision the
Roberts Court reaffirms in terms quite favorable to plaintiff investors.
Rather than jumping directly into a discussion of the three
decisions, which have been extraordinarily good news for investors
seeking to prosecute securities-fraud class actions, Part III provides
background of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine that Basic embraced,
explaining why many thought the decision might be vulnerable to
overruling. Part IV discusses Basic in the lower courts and the
controversy surrounding empirical evidence generated by efficientmarkets research that many commentators and courts quite erroneously
asserted was the foundation of Basic’s holding.
Part V then considers, in turn, the Roberts Court’s trilogy of openmarket securities-fraud class-certification decisions. It sets forth how
2. See infra text accompanying notes 42-54.
3. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (U.S. 2011) [hereinafter
Halliburton I].
4. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (U.S. 2013).
5. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (U.S. 2014) [hereinafter
Halliburton II].
6. Basic Inc. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
7. Id. at 241-47.
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Halliburton I relieved plaintiffs of the burden of proving loss causation
to obtain class certification – a requirement that had been a serious
stumbling block in the Fifth Circuit. Amgen then relieved plaintiffs of
the burden of proving a statement or omission’s materiality to obtain
class certification. And although Halliburton II vacated a classcertification order – affording the defendants a formal victory – that
victory is thoroughly Pyrrhic. For Halliburton II reaffirms the validity of
Basic and rejects rigid interpretations of market efficiency with an
opinion that sweeps away the underpinnings of numerous lower-court
precedents that have been problematic for plaintiffs.
Part VI outlines the favorable impact that Halliburton II has for
plaintiffs asserting open-market securities-fraud claims. It explains how
Halliburton II (1) overturns existing lower-court decisions employing
rigid notions of market efficiency; (2) upends precedents assuming that
the market instantaneously incorporates all information; (3) undermines
decisions withholding the fraud-on-the-market presumption in cases
involving initial public offerings; (4) undermines decisions demanding
that plaintiffs produce event studies; and (5) reverses the burdens on the
parties in cases involving so-called “confounding factors.”
Part VII offers a brief summary and conclusion.
II. THE ROBERTS COURT RECORD: SOMETIMES QUITE HOSPITABLE TO
CLASS PROCEEDINGS
Although it is easy to pick out Roberts Court decisions that vacate
class-certification orders or otherwise impair access to class relief, the
truth is that many Roberts Court decisions have been quite friendly to
class litigation.
Roberts Court decisions impeding class proceedings need little
introduction. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,8 for example, the Court
quashed class certification in a nationwide employment discrimination
class action seeking to prove that Wal-Mart’s practice of delegating
discretion to local managers and supervisors produced discriminatory
results.9 And in Comcast Corp. v. Berhend,10 the Roberts Court
overturned class certification where the plaintiffs’ expert – whose
testimony the plaintiffs submitted to show that antitrust injury and
damages could be established with common proof – attested that he
could not distinguish between economic harm caused by the antitrust
8.
9.
10.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011).
Id. at 2550-57.
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (U.S. 2013).
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claim asserted and harms associated with other claims excluded from the
class case.11
Yet even in Wal-Mart the five-justice majority’s objection was not
to class litigation, so much as it was to the plaintiffs’ theory of liability.
A five-justice majority believed the very nature of Wal-Mart’s
decentralized, discretionary decision-making foreclosed finding that the
case provided the kind of “common question” required by Rule 23(a).12
But it did so primarily because a majority disliked the plaintiffs’ central
theory of liability, that Wal-Mart’s policy of decentralized discretion
might be discriminatory: “Because respondents provide no convincing
proof of a company-wide discriminatory pay and promotion policy, we
have concluded that they have not established the existence of any
common questions.”13 As Justice Ginsburg observed in her dissent: “The
Court gives no credence to the key dispute common to the class: whether
Wal-Mart’s discretionary pay and promotion policies are
discriminatory.”14 Thus, Wal-Mart likely reflects a narrow understanding
of grounds for substantive liability under the civil-rights laws more than
it does a narrow view of Rule 23’s class-certification provisions.
Moreover, Comcast turned on specific deficiencies of a particular
expert’s analysis of antitrust injury and damages, which the plaintiffs
apparently had conceded they would need to show were provable on a
class basis.15 Given the “oddity of the case, in which the need to prove
damages on a classwide basis was never challenged,” Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer noted in a dissent joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan,
“[t]he Court’s ruling is good for this day and case only.”16 And though
the Court found the expert’s analysis deficient for incorporating
damages attributable to causes other than the violation asserted, the
majority opinion itself emphasizes that “[c]alculations need not be
exact,”17 favorably citing Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment

11. See id. at 1433-34.
12. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554-57.
13. See id. at 2556-57.
14. Id. at 2565 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting in part).
15. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1430 (“The District Court held, and it is uncontested here, that
to meet the predominance requirement respondents had to show (1) that the existence of individual
injury resulting from the alleged anti-trust violation (referred to as ‘antitrust impact’) was ‘capable
of proof at trial through evidence that [was] common to the class rather than individual to its
members’; and (2) that the damages resulting from that injury were measurable ‘on a class-wide
basis’ through use of a ‘common methodology.’”).
16. Id. at 1437.
17. Id. (citing Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563
(1931)).
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Paper Co.,18 which held that legitimate doubts concerning the amount of
damages generally should be resolved against culpable defendants.19
Comcast thereby reaffirms a rule quite favorable to plaintiffs, even if it
did not much help the plaintiffs in Comcast, whose damages case the
majority found was not even “‘consistent with [their] liability case.’”20
The Roberts Court’s decisions concerning arbitration agreements
and class proceedings may deal more serious blows to class proceedings,
at least where claims are subject to an arbitration agreement.21 The
Court’s 2010 decision in Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,22
severely curtailed the availability of class proceedings in arbitration by
holding that an arbitration clause’s silence on the subject precluded a
finding of consent to class arbitration proceedings.23 With AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,24 the Roberts Court then overturned a
substantial body of state-law precedent to the effect that arbitration
clauses precluding class proceedings, particularly in consumer cases,
may be found unconscionable and thus unenforceable.25 And with
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,26 the Court enforced
a contractual waiver of class arbitration where an individual proceeding
was not feasible because “the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a
federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.”27 Taken together,
these decisions could have truly devastating effects on the ability of
18. Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 563.
19. See id. The rule of Story Parchment clearly places the risk of uncertainty concerning the
amount of damages on wrongdoing defendants’ shoulders:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of
damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to
deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any
amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages may not be determined by mere
speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the damages as
a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate. The
wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the exactness
and precision that would be possible if the case, which he alone is responsible for
making, were otherwise . . . . [T]he risk of the uncertainty should be thrown upon the
wrongdoer instead of upon the injured party.
Id. (citations omitted).
20. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433 (quoting ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROVING
ANTITRUST DAMAGES: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 57, 62 (2d ed. 2010)).
21. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: Wal-Mart
v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CON. L. & PUB. POL. 73, 85-96 (2011);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court: Class (Action) Dismissed, L.A.TIMES, May 10, 2011.
22. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
23. Id. at 672-87.
24. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (U.S. 2011).
25. See id. at 1746-53.
26. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (U.S. 2013).
27. Id. at 2307.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss4/8

6

Isaacson: Securities Class Action

2015]

SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS

929

consumers, bound by arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion, ever to
obtain meaningful redress.28
Yet the Roberts Court’s decisions are by no means consistently
inhospitable to class litigation. Some are remarkably favorable.
Take Shady Grove Orthopedics Associates v. Allstate Insurance
Co.,29 for instance, which held that a New York law prohibiting class
actions to recover penalties or statutory minimum damages could not
keep a federal district court, sitting in diversity, from entertaining a class
action to recover such statutory penalties under New York law. Writing
for a five-justice majority that included Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Scalia did not have to look far for an answer to whether these claims
might proceed as a class action:
Rule 23 provides an answer. It states that ‘[a] class action may be
maintained’ if two conditions are met: the suit must satisfy the criteria
set forth in subdivision (a) (i.e., numerosity, commonality, typicality,
and adequacy of representation, and it must also fit into one of the
30
three categories described in subdivision (b).

“By its terms, this creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose
suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claims as a class action.”31
Indeed, the Court concluded, “Rule 23 provides a one-size-fits-all
28. These decisions’ likely effect is mitigated but little by Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter,
133 S. Ct. 2064 (U.S. 2013), where the Roberts Court sustained an arbitrator’s ruling that a specific
arbitration agreement permitted certain claims to be arbitrated on a class basis, since companies
intent on avoiding accountability can easily frame provisions to bar class proceedings.
29. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (U.S. 2010).
30. Id. at 1437. Those categories are set out as follows:
(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied
and if:
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a
risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that
would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter,
would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual
adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests;
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy. . . .
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
31. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437.
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formula for deciding the class-certification question,”32 one that “permits
all class actions that meet its requirements,” even if statutory policies of
the State under whose law the claims arise would preclude class
proceedings.33 To be clear: “Rule 23 unambiguously authorizes any
plaintiff, in any federal civil proceeding, to maintain a class action if the
rule’s prerequisites are met.”34 And if Rule 23’s requirements are met, a
federal judge has no discretion to deny certification. For when Rule 23
“says that if the prescribed conditions are satisfied ‘[a] class action may
be maintained,’” any “discretion suggested by Rule 23’s ‘may’ is
discretion residing in the plaintiff: He may bring his claim as a class
action if he wishes.”35 Those are words to warm any class-action
plaintiffs’ lawyer’s heart.
Consider Smith v. Bayer Corp.36 for another example of a Roberts
Court decision notably friendly to class litigation. The Court held that
denial of class certification in a federal proceeding asserting consumer
claims against a pharmaceutical company could not bar later
certification and entry of final judgment in state-court proceedings of an
essentially identical class to pursue the very same claims.37 A federal
district court that denied class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), finding
individual questions would predominate over common questions, had
enjoined a motion in a West Virginia state court for certification of
essentially the same class to assert the same claims.38 The federal district
judge thought that this edict came within the Anti-Injunction Act’s
provision permitting a federal court to enjoin state-court proceedings
when necessary “to protect or effectuate its judgments.”39 The Eighth
Circuit affirmed, noting that the Federal Rule 23 on certifying class
actions and West Virginia’s Rule 23 are virtually identical.40
But the Roberts Court reversed, giving two reasons, either of them
independently sufficient. First, Justice Kagan explained for a unanimous
Court, the courts below both erred in assuming that merely because
Federal Rule 23 and West Virginia Rule 23 are virtually identical, classcertification motions under those two rules present the same question in
state court as in a federal court. Because West Virginia’s courts
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id. at 1439.
Id. at 1442.
Id. at 1438.
Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (U.S. 2011).
See id. at 2379-81.
See id. at 2374.
Id. at 2374-75 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012)).
Smith v. Bayer Corp. (In re Baycol Prods. Litig.), 593 F.3d 716, 721-22 (8th Cir. 2010).
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approach Rule 23 issues rather differently than the federal district court
had, class certification in each forum presented different questions – and
certification of a class in state court thus would not conflict with the
earlier denial of class certification in the federal proceeding.41 Second,
Justice Kagan explained for all the Court but Justice Thomas (who was
content to join the Court’s opinion solely on its first ground), a denial of
class certification never binds members of the putative class – since it is
only certification and notice that make a judgment binding on absent
class members.42
That, once again, is a ruling sure to please class-action plaintiffs’
lawyers. Without a single dissenting voice, the Roberts Court overruled
circuit-court decisions barring what the lower courts had condemned as
“serial litigation” of class-certification rulings.43
If one turns from employment, antitrust, and consumer cases to the
Roberts Court’s recent decisions in litigation involving investors’
claims, the picture gets even better for plaintiffs seeking to proceed on
behalf of a class.
In Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice,44 the Roberts Court held
that victims of a Ponzi scheme – whose promoters purported to (but in
fact did not) invest assets in securities trading on U.S. stock exchanges –
are not subject to preclusion of their state-law claims under the federal
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”).45 Enacted in
1998 to keep litigants from avoiding certain restrictions that the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)46 imposed on
federal securities litigation,47 SLUSA forecloses state-law class actions
alleging false statements made in connection with the purchase or sale of
any “covered security” – which the statute defines to include U.S.exchange-traded securities and mutual funds.48 A series of lower-court
41. Smith, 131 S. Ct. at 2376-79.
42. Id. at 2379-82.
43. Id. at 2381. The Court expressly disapproved of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003), which had “objected to ‘an asymmetric
system in which class counsel can win but never lose’ because of their ability to relitigate the issue
of class certification.”
44. Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (U.S. 2014).
45. Id. at 1062-64.
46. See Pub.L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1,
78u-4).
47. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81-82 (2006).
48. SLUSA expressly precludes state-law class actions alleging misrepresentations or
omissions, or the use of “any manipulative device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or
sale of any covered security,” 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1) (2012), with “covered security” defined to
include securities qualified for trading on U.S. stock exchanges. See id. § 78bb(f)(5)(E).
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decisions, including several in cases seeking relief for Bernie Madoff’s
victims, had held that SLUSA precluded state-law claims if a Ponzi
scheme’s operators falsely said they were investing assets in exchangetraded securities.49 When the Fifth Circuit ruled that similar claims
asserted by victims of Alan Stanford’s Ponzi scheme were not barred by
SLUSA, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.50
I imagine many assumed the Roberts Court would make short work
of the Stanford investors’ class claims. Even the federal government, as
a friend of the Court, asserted that the claims were SLUSA-precluded.51
Yet with only two justices (Kennedy joined by Alito) dissenting,52 the
Roberts Court ruled that the investors’ state-law class-action claims were
not barred.53 Even if investments in Stanford’s Ponzi scheme were
purportedly backed by covered securities, what the scheme’s victims
actually received was not an exchange-traded “covered security,” and
their claims thus were not precluded by SLUSA.54 Score another Roberts
Court victory for class-action plaintiffs.
III. BACKGROUND OF THE ROBERTS COURT’S SECURITIES CLASSACTION DECISIONS: THE 1988 REHNQUIST COURT BASIC V. LEVINSON
DECISION AND THE PRESUMPTION OF MARKET RELIANCE
Ponzi-scheme claims account for relatively little investment-fraud
litigation. Far more important, in practical terms, are open-market

49. See, e.g., Backus v. Connecticut Cmty Bank, N.A., 789 F. Supp. 2d 292, 305-06 (D.
Conn. 2011); In re Herald, Primeo, & Thema Sec. Litig., No. 09 Civ. 289 (RMB), 2011 WL
5928952, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011), aff’d 730 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2013), reh’g denied, 753 F.
3d 110 (2d Cir. 2014), petitions for cert. filed sub nom. Davis v. Kohn, No. 14-730 (Dec. 17, 2014)
and Trezziova v. Kohn, No. 14-736 (Dec. 17, 2014); In re Kingate Mgt. Ltd. Litig., No. 09 Civ.
5386 (DAB), 2011 WL 1362106, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011); Newman v. Family Mgmt. Corp.,
748 F. Supp. 2d 299, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Beacon Assocs. Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d 386, 430
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Wolf Living Trust v. FM Multi-Strategy Inv. Fund, L.P., No. 09 Civ. 1540 (LBS),
2010 WL 4457322, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2010); but see Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728
F. Supp. 2d 372, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). This Article’s author is appellate counsel for an investor in
the Herald, Primeo, & Thema proceeding.
50. See Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 520-24 (5th Cir. 2012), cert granted sub nom.
Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 977 (U.S. 2013), Willis of Colo. Inc. v. Troice, 133
S. Ct. 977 (U.S. 2013), and Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, 133 S. Ct. 978 (U.S. 2013).
51. See Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9 et seq.,
Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (U.S. 2014), 2013 WL 1947418, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs-v2/12-7912-86-12-88_pet-amcu-usa.pdf.
52. Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1072-81 (U.S. 2014) (Kennedy, J.,
joined by Alito, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 1066-72.
54. Id. at 1071-73.
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securities-fraud cases alleging that misleading public statements of a
securities issuer, its top officers, and occasionally others (such as the
issuer’s underwriters or its auditors) manipulated the price at which the
issuer’s securities traded on the stock market.
We shall now turn to such fraud-on-the-market cases. As discussed
below, three recent Roberts Court decisions address class certification in
such cases, every one of them rejecting attempts to heighten the showing
required of plaintiff investors seeking class certification in open-market
securities-fraud cases.55 But first some background, as each of the three
decisions construes and applies a 1988 Rehnquist Court decision
embracing the fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance for open-market
securities-fraud cases.
I think it is important to begin by describing how Basic came to
hold that material misrepresentations can be presumed to affect an
actively traded security’s market price, and that investors may further be
presumed to rely upon the integrity of that price.56 This of course means
that the element of reliance can be presumed in “fraud-on-the-market”
cases without the kind of direct proof concerning each individual class
member’s state of mind that might defeat class certification under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) by causing individual questions
to predominate over common ones.57
From the outset, however, Basic was a controversial decision.
Though Basic emanated from the Rehnquist Court, three prominent
conservatives – Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Kennedy – did not participate.58 With a six-justice quorum to decide the
case, the majority opinion endorsing the fraud-on-the-market theory was
rendered by a rather liberal four-justice majority: Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.59 Two relatively
moderate conservatives, Justice White joined by Justice O’Connor,
charged in dissent that the majority’s ruling rested upon a nascent (and
the dissenters thought doubtful) economic theory framed by the socalled “Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis” or “Efficient Markets
Hypothesis” (frequently abbreviated “ECMH” or “EMH”).60 One had to
wonder – had Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Kennedy participated in the decision, might they have cast their votes
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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Id. at 250-62 (White, J., dissenting).

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 8

934

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:923

with Justices White and O’Connor, thereby turning Justice Blackmun’s
four-justice majority opinion into a four-justice dissent?61
Basic was also, perhaps, a somewhat ambiguous opinion, leaving
lower courts to interpret it in a variety of ways. Given its citation of
empirical evidence generated by efficient-markets research, some
observers concluded (as Justice White’s dissent asserted) that the
majority’s opinion hinged upon the extreme notion of “efficiency” stated
by the ECMH, requiring all publicly available information always to be
fully incorporated in a security’s market price.62 Some courts took the
hypothesis literally, expecting information to be incorporated in market
price both immediately and completely.63 Some, such as the Fifth
Circuit, believed they had license to “tighten” access to Basic’s
presumption of reliance by adding further threshold requirements –
demanding, for example, that plaintiff investors prove “loss causation”
in order to obtain class certification.64 Circuits divided on whether
plaintiffs had to establish loss causation, or the materiality of the
statements and omissions at issue, in order to obtain class certification.65
Some courts, again including the Fifth Circuit, ruled against plaintiffs’
claims whenever “confounding” factors made it difficult to parse out the
separate effects of several simultaneous disclosures.66
A.

Background of Basic: The Rise of the Fraud-on-the-Market
Doctrine

When the 73rd Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (“Exchange Act” or “1934 Act”) to regulate securities markets and
require that publicly traded securities’ issuers file periodic reports
disclosing information material to the securities’ valuation, it prefaced
the statute with a statement on the “Necessity for Regulation.”67
Congress’ codified prefatory statement observed that the stock market’s
published price quotations themselves had come to “constitute a basis

61. See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS.
L. REV. 151, 157 (2009) (“The line-up of justices was remarkably skewed . . . Justice Anthony
Kennedy was not sworn in until a few months after the oral argument. Two other key conservatives,
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia recused themselves. Basic was decided by six,
mostly liberal, justices.”). See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 122-25.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 140-43.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 168-75.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 144-45.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 329-30.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).
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for determining the prices at which securities are bought and sold.”68
Unfortunately, “the prices of securities on such exchanges and markets
are susceptible to manipulation.”69 Congress said it thus intended the
1934 Act “to require appropriate reports” by securities issuers of
material information concerning their operation and results, “and to
insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets,”70 so that securities
might trade at their “fair valuation” on the basis of complete and truthful
information.71 The statutory preface thus reflects Congress’
understanding that market prices reflect publicly available information,
and Congress’ intention that investors should be able to rely on the
integrity of the resulting price quotations.
Two sections of the 1934 Act spoke directly to the manipulation of
securities markets. With 1934 Act § 9, Congress proscribed specified
manipulative practices and provided an express cause of action affording
relief to “any person who shall purchase or sell any security at a price
which was affected” by the proscribed deceptive acts, or by the
misleading statements of brokers, dealers, and others buying and selling
securities.72 Recognizing that other persons too might seek to manipulate
securities prices, and in perhaps unforeseen ways, Congress added §
10(b) as a broad “catch-all” provision making it “unlawful for any
person” to employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security, “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may
prescribe.”73 Promulgated by the SEC in 1942, Rule 10b-5 made it
unlawful, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, for any
person (1) to “employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” (2) to
make false or misleading statements, or (3) to “engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit
upon any person.”74 Federal courts soon recognized an implied right of
68. Id. § 78b(2).
69. Id. § 78b(3).
70. Id. § 78b.
71. Id. § 78b(3).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f) (2012).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (emphasis added). See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 202-03 (1976) (quoting legislative history describing the provision as “‘a catch-all clause’”
conferring “‘the authority to deal with new manipulative devices’”) (citing Stock Exchange
Regulation, Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the H. Comm, on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 115 (1934)).
74. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014); see Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities
Laws, 22 BUS. LAW. 793, 921-23 (1967) (remarks of Milton Freeman). Captioned “Employment of
Manipulative and Deceptive Devices,” Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
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action under § 10(b) for violations of Rule 10b-5,75 which the Supreme
Court, by the 1980s, itself recognized as “simply beyond
peradventure.”76
As a matter of plain English, § 10(b)’s reference to “any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” encompassed conduct
calculated to manipulate stock-market prices – that is, “[t]o force
(prices) up or down, as by matched orders, wash sales [or] fictitious
reports,” such as false or misleading public statements.77 The common
law of market manipulation, since the 1814 King’s Bench ruling in Rex
v. De Berenger,78 had recognized that a security’s price can be
manipulated with false public statements, since the deliberate
dissemination of false rumors into a securities market “strikes at the
price of a vendible commodity in the market, and if it gives it a fictitious
price by means of false rumors, it is a fraud levelled [sic] against all the
public, for it is against all such as may possibly have anything to do with
the funds on that particular day.”79
From false rumors influencing securities’ prices, the common-law
precedents had proceeded to deceptive acts and transactions similarly
designed to affect market prices by creating the false appearance of
active trading and, thus, the false appearance of real demand for the
security. As Chief Justice Burger observed for a unanimous Court in
Schreiber v. Burlingtom Northern, Inc.,80 a seminal 1892 decision that
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
75. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514-15 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
76. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983).
77. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199 n.21 (quoting WEBSTER’S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d
ed. 1934)) (emphasis added). See generally A.A. Berle, Jr., Liability for Stock Market Manipulation,
31 COLUM. L. REV. 264, 278-79 (1931); see also A.A. Berle, Jr., Stock Market Manipulation, 38
Colum. L. Rev. 393, 403 (1938).
78. Rex v. De Berenger, (1814) 105 Eng. Rep. 536 (K.B.) 538; 3 Maule & Selwyn 67, 72-73.
79. Id.; see McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 649 (1899) (quoting Lord Ellenborough’s
opinion in De Berenger to hold that bid rigging is against public policy); United States v. Brown, 5
F. Supp. 81, 85-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff’d 79 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1935); Morris Run Coal Co., v.
Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173, 187-88 (1871); State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 348 (Md. App.
1821).
80. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
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“broke new ground in recognizing that manipulation could occur without
the dissemination of false statements” had itself “placed emphasis on the
presence of deception” effected by sham transactions executed to create
the appearance of active trading.81 “As Lord Lopes stated in that case, ‘I
can see no substantial distinction between false rumours and false and
fictitious acts.’”82 Or, as a federal district court put it in early 1933,83
“‘even a speculator is entitled not to have any present fact involving the
subject matter of his speculative purchase or the price thereof
misrepresented by word or act.”84 This was the common-law background
against which Congress legislated in the 1930s.
Following 1966 amendments to Rule 23 that were designed to
facilitate class litigation85 and, the Advisory Committee Notes said, to do
so specifically in cases of mass fraud,86 the federal courts naturally gave
effect to § 10(b)’s statutory proscription of manipulative practices by
allowing investors, whose transactions were executed at prices affected
by fraud, to recover without requiring proof that each individual investor
subjectively knew of the particular false and misleading statements that
had impaired the market’s integrity. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the
Ninth Circuit explained in Blackie v. Barrack,87 “are designed to foster
an expectation that securities markets are free from fraud – an
expectation on which purchasers should be able to rely.”88 And because
81. Id. at 7 n.4 (citing Scott v. Brown, Doering, McNab & Co., [1892] 2 Q. B. 724 (Eng.).
82. Id. (quoting Scott, 2 Q.B. at 730).
83. Id. (quoting United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff’d, 79 F.2d
321 (2d Cir. 1935)).
84. Id. (quoting Brown, 5 F. Supp. at 85) (Schreiber’s brackets); see also Willcox v.
Harriman Sec. Corp., 10 F. Supp. 532, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
85. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833 (1999) (“[M]odern class action practice
emerged in the 1966 revision of Rule 23”).
86. The Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 amendments identified “a fraud perpetrated
on numerous persons” as “an appealing situation for a class action” despite individual issues
concerning injury and damages. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3), Advisory Committee Note to 1966
Amendment; see Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1437 (U.S. 2013) (Ginsburg, J., and
Breyer, J., dissenting); In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 139 (2d Cir.
2001); Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc. (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 471 F.3d 977,
990 (9th Cir. 2006); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 300-01 (2d Cir. 1968); Esplin v. Hirschi,
402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968).
87. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
88. See, e.g., id. at 907; accord, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986);
Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F. 2d 355, 367 & n.9 (8th Cir. 1986); Lipton v. Documation, Inc.,
734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1984); T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth.,
717 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (10th Cir. 1983); Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 367-68 (2d Cir. 1981),
vacated, Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 459 U.S. 1027 (1982); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d
545, 553 (2d Cir. 1979); Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., 555 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re
LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Wolgin v. Magic Marker Corp., 82 F.R.D. 168,
169-70, 176-77 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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market prices respond to and reflect publicly available information, in
open-market fraud cases involving actively traded securities the element
of reliance could sensibly be “established indirectly, by proof of
materiality coupled with the common sense that a stock purchaser does
not ordinarily seek to purchase a loss in the form of artificially inflated
stock.”89 Applying “to all fraud on the market cases, individual as well
as class actions,” the resulting presumption of reliance obviously
facilitated certification of class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) by ensuring
that individual issues concerning reliance would not overwhelm
common ones.90
B.

Basic Inc. v. Levinson

Such was the state of the law in 1988, when the fraud-on-themarket theory reached the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.91
Yet three prominent conservative justices did not participate in the
decision: Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia recused themselves,
and Justice Kennedy had been sworn in after the case was argued.92 And
although the resulting quorum of six justices was unanimous on the
materiality standard that should govern § 10(b) claims,93 Justice
Blackmun wrote for a majority of only four on class certification under
the fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance, joined on this issue by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.94
The four rather liberal justices agreed with the circuit courts that
“where materially misleading statements have been disseminated into an
impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the reliance of
individual plaintiffs on the integrity of the market price may be
presumed.”95 Basic thus held that when securities trade in an “open and
developed” or “efficient” market, the element of reliance may be
established based upon the presumption that an actively traded security’s
price likely reflects most publicly available information about the issuer,
89. Blackie, 524 F.2d at 908.
90. Id.
91. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
92. Id. at 225, 241-50; see supra note 61.
93. See id. at 230-41 (adopting and applying the materiality standard of TSC Indus. v.
Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976)).
94. Id. at 225; see id. at 241-50. The six-justice Court was unanimous on another issue,
concerning the standard for evaluating materiality. See id. at 226-41; id. at 250 (White, J., joined by
O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (“I join Parts I-III of the Court’s opinion, as I agree that the
standard of materiality we set forth in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976), should be applied to actions under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”).
95. Id. at 247, n.25.
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coupled with the further understanding that investors are entitled to
assume that market prices are not manipulated by fraud – the “integrity”
of the market.96
The Court thus rejected contentions that reliance is an element of
open-market securities-fraud claims whose proof would cause
individualized issues to predominate over class issues, thereby
precluding class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that
“questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members.”97
Noting “that reliance is and long has been an element of commonlaw fraud,” the Court agreed with the defendants “that reliance is an
element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action.”98 Indeed, “Reliance provides
the requisite causal connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation
and a plaintiff’s injury.”99
“There is, however, more than one way to demonstrate the causal
connection,” the Court continued, noting that its opinion in Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States100 had “dispensed with a requirement of
positive proof of reliance, where a duty to disclose material information
had been breached.”101 Affiliated Ute had indeed held, in a case
involving breach of a duty to disclose, that “positive proof of reliance is
not a prerequisite to recovery” under § 10(b).102 “All that is necessary is
that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor
might have considered them important,” in which case the “obligation to
disclose and [the] withholding of a material fact establish the requisite
element of causation in fact.”103
96. See id.
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see Basic, 485 U.S. at 243.
98. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243.
99. Id.
100. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. Utah, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
101. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 (citing Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153-54).
102. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153.
103. Id. at 153-54. Affiliated Ute, incidentally, mirrors the common-law rule that reliance may
be inferentially presumed from a misleading statement or omission’s materiality. See RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 479 & cmt. a (1932) (“Materiality of a fraudulent misrepresentation is
essential before any presumption arises that it induced action.”); Terra Firma Invs. (GP) 2 Ltd. v.
Citigroup, Inc., 716 F.3d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 2013) (applying English common-law rule: “When the
misrepresentation is one on which a reasonable person would rely, there is a rebuttable presumption
of reliance.”); Lamborn v. Wm. M. Hardie Co., 1 F.2d 679, 682 (6th Cir. 1924) (holding that “even
if this presumption is always one of fact and is rebuttable, yet unless it is rebutted it must prevail”);
Abel v. Paterno, 285 N.Y.S. 58, 64 (N.Y. App. Div. 1935) (following Redgrave v. Hurd, (1881) 20
Ch. 1 at 21 (Lord Jessel) (Eng.)). That some federal decisions insist Affiliated Ute’s presumption
inferring reliance from materiality cannot apply to cases involving misstatements, or to “mixed”
cases where material omissions caused affirmative statements to be misleading is, to put it bluntly,
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The fraud-on-the-market theory similarly provided an appropriate
causal link, Justice Blackmun explained,
based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities
market, the price of a company’s stock is determined by the available
material information regarding the company and its business . . . .
Misleading statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even
if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. . . . The
causal connection between the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’
purchase of stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of
104
direct reliance on misrepresentations.

In framing the 1934 Act, Justice Blackmun observed, “Congress
expressly relied on the premise that securities markets are affected by
information” and “enacted legislation to facilitate an investor’s reliance
on the integrity of those markets.”105 “An investor who buys or sells
stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of
that price,” the Court thus held.106 “Because most publicly available
information is reflected in the market price, an investor’s reliance on any
public misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a
Rule 10b-5 action.”107
Although Justice Blackmun rested the Court’s opinion upon the
enacting Congress’ understanding of securities markets’ functioning in
the 1930s, he also observed that “[r]ecent empirical studies have tended
to confirm Congress’ premise that the market price of shares traded on
passing strange. See, e.g., Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713, 716-17 (8th Cir. 1978);
Desai v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Ltd., 573 F.3d 931, 946 (9th Cir. 2009) (Graber, J., concurring);
Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999); Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1163
(10th Cir. 2000); Cavalier Carpets v. Caylor, 746 F.2d 749, 756-57 (11th Cir. 1984) (“mixed case”);
Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 722 (11th Cir. 1987). Other precedents have
sensibly refused to draw a distinction that makes little sense. E.g., Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson &
Co., 903 F.2d 186, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1990); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 187-88 (3d
Cir. 1981); see also Binder, 184 F.3d at 1069 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting in part).
104. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-42 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir.
1986)).
105. Id. at 246 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1383, at 11 (1934)):
“No investor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges
without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to the value of the
securities he buys or sells. The idea of a free and open public market is built upon the
theory that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of a security
brings [sic] about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just
price. Just as artificial manipulation tends to upset the true function of an open market,
so the hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operation of the
markets as indices of real value.”
106. Id. at 247.
107. Id. (emphasis added).
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well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information and,
hence, any material misrepresentations.”108 A footnote referenced
sources “citing literature on efficient-capital-market theory,”109 in which
academics had employed extreme definitions of “efficiency” to test just
how quickly and completely securities markets react to new
information.110
Far from purporting to adopt ECMH or any other extreme model of
market efficiency, however, the Court emphasized:
We need not determine by adjudication what economists and social
scientists have debated through the use of sophisticated statistical
analysis and the application of economic theory. For purposes of
accepting the presumption of reliance in this case, we need only
believe that market professionals generally consider most publicly
announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting
111
stock market prices.

“By accepting this rebuttable presumption,” the Court reiterated,
“we do not intend conclusively to adopt any particular theory of how
quickly and completely publicly available information is reflected in
market price.”112 It was enough that securities markets tend to respond to
and reflect most publicly available information, even if the responses are
not always instantaneous or complete.
The resulting presumption of reliance, the Court then added, is
rebuttable: “Any showing that severs the link between the alleged
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff,
or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut
the presumption of reliance.”113 If defendants “could show that the
‘market makers’ were privy to the truth,” for example, “and thus that the
market price would not have been affected by their misrepresentations,
the causal connection could be broken: the basis for finding that the
fraud had been transmitted through market price would be gone.”114
108. Id. at 246 & n. 24.
109. Id. at 246 & n. 24 (citing, inter alia, Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in
Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 4 n.9 (1982)).
110. See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,
24 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970).
111. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 n. 24.
112. Id. at 248 n. 28.
113. Id.
114. Id. The Court’s reference to ‘market makers’ appears, at first glance, to be one of finance
jargon: “A ‘market maker’ is a firm that stands ready to buy and sell a particular stock on a
continuous basis at a publicly quoted price.” Market Maker, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM.,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mktmaker.htm (last modified Mar. 17, 2000). But whether the Court’s
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“Similarly, if, despite [the defendants’] allegedly fraudulent attempt to
manipulate market price, news of [the truth] credibly entered the market
and dissipated the effects of the misstatements, those who traded [the
company’s] shares after the corrective statements could have no direct or
indirect connection with the fraud.”115 “Proof of that sort,” the Court
noted, “is a matter for trial, throughout which the District Court retains
authority to amend the certification order as may be appropriate.”116
Justice White filed a dissent that ignored Justice Blackmun’s
disclaimers that the Court’s decision neither endorsed, nor rested upon,
any particular theory of just how quickly or completely market prices
incorporate publicly available information. Justice White charged that
“the fraud-on-the-market theory is a mere babe,”117 born of the “efficient
capital market hypothesis,”118 which Justice White characterized as “‘an
economic concept that did not exist twenty years ago.’”119 To embrace it
he reckoned was a mistake: “For while the economists’ theories which
underpin the fraud-on-the-market presumption may have the appeal of
mathematical exactitude and scientific certainty, they are – in the end –
nothing more than theories which may or may not prove accurate upon
further consideration.”120 “Consequently,” Justice White concluded, “I
cannot reconfigure securities laws, based on recent economic theories, to
better fit what it perceives to be the new realities of financial
markets.”121
Beyond that, Justice White declared that any presumption that
investors rely on the “integrity of the market price” is contrary to fact, as
“‘many investors purchase or sell stock because they believe the price
inaccurately reflects the corporation’s worth.’”122
Since Basic was decided by a six-justice Court, with two moderate
justices dissenting, one had to wonder whether the participation of the
reference to “market makers” was really intended in this technical sense, or as a looser reference to
the market’s major participants, is not entirely clear. Informed traders generally put more effort into
finding and evaluating information than do market insiders, whose obligation it is merely to “make
a market,” i.e., to stand ready to ensure liquidity, to meet traders’ demands.
115. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248-49.
116. Id. at 249 n.29.
117. Id. at 250 (White, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 253 & n.4.
119. Id. (quoting Ronald Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 549-50 (1984)).
120. Id. at 254.
121. Id. at 255.
122. Id. at 255-56 (quoting Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing
with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435, 455
(1984)).
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Court’s three permanent conservatives – Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Kennedy – might have changed the result. Bound by
the decision in any event, lower courts proceeded to apply it.
IV. BASIC IN THE LOWER COURTS
Despite Basic’s clear statement that “[b]y accepting this rebuttable
presumption, we do not intend conclusively to adopt any particular
theory of how quickly and completely publicly available information is
reflected in market price,”123 a loud chorus developed in the legal
academy insisting that the Court had indeed embraced the strict notions
of efficiency framed by ECMH, providing the rationale upon which
many insisted Basic’s presumption of reliance thus rested.124 Many
lower courts also appeared to accept this view.125 Somehow overlooking
123. Id. at 249 n.28.
124. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1060 (1990) (purporting to
analyze “adoption of the ECMH by the Court in Basic”); Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating
How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 965 (1991) (“the Basic plurality [sic]
seems to rely on the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH),” that “as a logical matter, must
underlie the fraud-on-the-market presumption”); Larry E. Ribstein, Dabit, Preemption, and Choice
of Law, SUP. CT. REV. 141, 143-44 (2005) (“the ECMH provided the impetus and rationale for the
‘fraud-on-the-market’ theory adopted in Basic”); Matthew Eisler, Note, Difficult, Duplicative and
Wasteful?: The NASD’s Prohibition of Class Action Arbitration in the Post-Bazzle Era, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1891, 1920 n. 210 (2007) (emphasis added) (“In order to prove fraud on the
market, the plaintiff class must show that there is an efficient capital market for the disputed
security. The efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH) operates in securities markets where the
market price instantly reflects information disseminated to the marketplace.”); Nathaniel Carden,
Comment, Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 for the Judicial
Presumptions of Market Efficiency, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 880 (1998) (“Despite this emerging
debate, most courts and legal commentators have remained steadfastly committed to the ECMH.
The Supreme Court, for example, employed the ECMH in the influential case Basic Inc. v.
Levinson.”).
125. See, e.g., Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1195 (11th Cir. 2013) (asserting that “[t]he
fraud-on-the-market theory . . . ‘derives from the so-called efficient capital market hypothesis’”)
(citation omitted); Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th
Cir. 2011) (Basic “rests on the efficient capital market hypothesis”); FindWhat Investor Grp. v.
FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Fraud-on-the-market claims derive from
the so-called efficient market hypothesis . . . .”); ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund. Ltd., 493
F.3d 87, 100 n.4 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 246) (“The efficient capital market
hypothesis, as adopted by the Supreme Court, points that ‘the market price of shares traded on welldeveloped markets reflects all publicly available information’”); Bowe v. PolyMedica Corp. (In re
PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 432 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Fama, supra note 110)
(emphasis added) (“According to the prevailing definition of market efficiency, an efficient market
is one in which market price fully reflects all publicly available information.”)); George v. China
Auto Sys., No. 11 Civ. 7533, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93698, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013); In re
Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (Vaughn Walker, D.J.) (citing “the
efficient capital market hypothesis endorsed by the plurality [sic] in Basic”); In re Seagate Tech.
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the common law of market manipulation,126 some state courts refused to
follow Basic on account of qualms about EMCH.127
Professor Eugene Fama’s 1970 review of the evidence for ECMH
framed three versions of the hypothesis: “weak,” “semi-strong,” and
“strong.”128 Many courts and commentators specifically identified
Basic’s presumption with Professor Fama’s “semi-strong” hypothesis,
that securities prices at all times reflect all publicly available
information.129 Fama’s “weak” hypothesis stated only that information
from past prices is fully incorporated in a stock’s current price – making
it impossible to devise profitable trading strategies based on trading on
ostensible price trends or on “technical analysis” of a stock’s historical
price charts.130 Fama’s “strong” hypothesis stated that all information,
both public and private, is reflected in stock prices.131 Tests of the
hypothesis, in its several forms, asked whether investors could devise
profitable trading strategies on the basis of each type of information.132
The ability to earn excess profits (above ordinary stock-market index
returns) by trading on information would indicate some degree of
inefficiency.
By focusing on ECMH and the efficient-markets literature of the
1970s and 1980s, however, many overlooked the fact that even in the
1930s it was well known that securities markets respond to public

Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1354 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (Vaughn Walker, D.J.) (Basic’s “rule draws
its intellectual sustenance not from law, but from the efficient capital market hypothesis”).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 77-84; infra note 133.
127. See, e.g., Kaufman v. I-Stat Corp., 754 A.2d 1188, 1198-1201 (N.J. 2000); Fink v. Ricoh
Corp., 839 A.2d 942, 962-63 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003).
128. See Fama, supra note 110,at 383-88.
129. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 124, at 1062 (“We show that the Court implicitly
adopted the semi-strong form of the ECMH.”); In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 631 (3d
Cir. 2011) (“The Supreme Court appears to have adopted the semi-strong version of the efficient
capital market hypothesis.”); Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 684-85 (7th Cir. 2010) (“the fraudon-the-market doctrine rests on the semi-strong form” of ECMH); Oscar Private Equity Investors v.
Allegiance Telecom, 487 F.3d 261, 269 (5th Cir. 2007) (asserting that in fraud-on-the-market cases
“loss causation speaks to the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis on which classwide reliance
depends”); PolyMedica Corp., 432 F.3d at10 n.16 (quoting In re Res. Am. Sec. Litig., 202 F.R.D.
177, 189 (E.D. Pa. 2001)) (“‘the Basic court adopted the semi-strong form of market efficiency as a
prerequisite for a fraud on the market presumption’”).
130. See Fama, supra note 110, at 388.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 383; see also Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An
Introduction to the New Finance, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 635, 651 (2003) (a market is efficient when
“prices respond so quickly to new information that it is impossible for traders to make trading
profits on the basis of that information”); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash,
and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 913 (1989) (“a market is efficient if
it is impossible to devise a trading rule that systematically outperforms the market”).
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information and, thus, are subject to manipulation by false statements.133
This was a foundational assumption of the common law of market
manipulation134 and is reflected in the 1934 Act’s statutory preface,135 in
§ 9’s proscription of specific manipulative acts,136 and in § 10(b)’s
broader proscription of manipulative contrivances.137 But it somehow
escaped those who, like Justice White in dissent, assumed that Basic’s
fraud-on-the-market theory rested upon recent framings of the ECMH.
Justice White was right about one thing, though: embracing financial
economists’ working research hypothesis could easily engender
confusion. It surely did.
Fama himself warned that “the hypothesis that security prices at
any point in time ‘fully reflect’ all available information,” though a
useful research tool, “is obviously an extreme null hypothesis. And, like
any other extreme null hypothesis, we do not expect it to be literally
true.”138 And Professor Burton Malkiel has observed that “the market
cannot be perfectly efficient, or there would be no incentive for
professionals to uncover the information that gets so quickly reflected in
market prices.”139
133. See, e.g., Berle, Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, supra note 77, at 268-69;
GEORGE RUTLEDGE GIBSON, THE STOCK EXCHANGES OF LONDON, PARIS, AND NEW YORK: A
COMPARISON 11 (1889). Robert Shiller cites Gibson’s treatise to show that although the “Efficient
Capital Markets Hypothesis” was coined by Eugene Fama in the 1960s and popularized in the
1970s, the concept of market efficiency has long held force:
The idea of efficient markets is so natural that it has probably been with us for centuries.
Although the term efficient markets apparently first became widely known through the
work of University of Chicago professor Eugene Fama and his colleagues in the late
1960s, the theory itself preceded this name by many years. It was clearly mentioned in
1889 in a book by George Gibson entitled The Stock Markets of London, Paris and New
York. Gibson wrote that when “shares become publicly known in an open market, the
value which they acquire may be regarded as the judgment of the best intelligence concerning them.” In this century, the efficient markets theory has long been a fixture in
university economics and finance departments.
ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 178 (2d ed. 2005); see also ROBERT SHILLER,
MARKET VOLATILITY 432, 438 n.3 1992) (“The efficient markets theory is not, as some finance
textbooks imply, basically a sophisticated theory that came from the University of Chicago in the
1960s. It is actually a very old theory . . . .”).
134. See id.; VIII LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION
517-23 (4th ed. 2012).
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2012).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 n.21
(1976).
138. Fama, supra note 110, at 388.
139. Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP.
59, 80 (2003) (citing Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980)); accord, e.g., Stout, supra note
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Some lower courts, nonetheless, took ECMH quite literally, treating
market efficiency as a binary all-or-nothing concept under which all
information must be fully absorbed “immediately following
disclosure.”140 For example, after the First Circuit defined “efficiency”
in In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.141 to require “that market price
responds so quickly to new information that ordinary investors cannot
make trading profits on the basis of such information,”142 the district
court on remand denied class certification of an exchange-traded stock
because this conception of efficiency “requires that the reaction to news
be fully completed on the same trading day as its release – and perhaps
even within hours or minutes.”143
Some courts, including the Fifth Circuit, believed that Basic gave
them license to impose their own overlay of requirements before a
plaintiff could successfully invoke the presumption of reliance. Circuits
divided on whether plaintiffs should be required to prove loss causation
at the class-certification stage.144 They also divided on whether a
plaintiff must demonstrate materiality in order to obtain class
certification.145 Only the Supreme Court could resolve their differences,
setting the stage for the Roberts Court’s three recent fraud-on-the-market
class-certification decisions.
V. THE ROBERTS’ COURT’S FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET CLASS-ACTION
TRILOGY: HALLIBURTON I, AMGEN, AND HALLIBURTON II
With growing disorder in the lower courts, the Roberts Court began
to sort things out in a series of three cases specifically concerning
Basic’s application at the class-certification stage.
The first of the three is Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton,
Co.,146 or “Halliburton I,” in which Chief Justice Roberts authored a
132, at 640 n.24.
140. Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000); accord, e.g., City of Monroe Emps.
Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 676 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Burlington Coat
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997)) (“in an open and efficient securities market
‘information important to reasonable investors’ (in effect, the market) is immediately incorporated
into stock prices”).
141. Bowe v. PolyMedica Corp. (In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 432 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2005).
142. Id. at 19.
143. In re PolyMedica Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260, 278 (D. Mass. 2006).
144. Compare Oscar Private Equity Inv. v. Allegiance Telecom, 487 F.3d 261, 265-70 (5th
Cir. 2007) with Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685-87 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting Oscar).
145. Compare PolyMedica Corp. 432 F.3d 1 at 7 n.11 (proof of materiality required) with
Schleicher, 618 F.3d at 687-88 (proof of materiality not required for class certification).
146. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179 (U.S. 2011).
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unanimous opinion overturning a line of Fifth Circuit decisions requiring
plaintiffs to prove loss causation as a prerequisite for class certification
in fraud-on-the-market cases.147 This was a clear victory for plaintiff
investors seeking class certification, but the Court limited its ruling to
the element of loss causation.148 Halliburton argued that its evidence
purporting to rebut “loss causation” also showed that its allegedly
misleading statements had no “price impact” and that this should
preclude class certification independently of any loss-causation
requirement; but the Supreme Court declined to pass on an argument not
considered below.149
In the second decision, Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement
Plans and Trust Funds,150 Justice Ginsburg wrote for a six-justice
majority (including the Chief Justice). Although only material
misrepresentations and omissions can affect a security’s market price, a
divided Court held that proof of materiality is not a prerequisite to class
certification,151 overturning circuit-court decisions that had demanded
such proof.152
Again, plaintiffs had prevailed, but this time three justices
dissented. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas (whose dissent was joined
in part by Justice Scalia and in whole by Justice Kennedy) each filed
opinions that directly challenged Basic’s continuing legitimacy as
precedent.153 More troubling still, Justice Alito’s concurring opinion
stated he joined the Amgen majority only because “petitioners did not
ask us to revisit Basic’s fraud-on-the-market presumption,” which, he
agreed with the dissenters, “may rest on a faulty economic premise.”154
Thus, Justice Alito concluded, “reconsideration of the Basic presumption
may be appropriate.”155
With at least four justices suggesting their readiness to reconsider
and perhaps overrule Basic, the stage was set for the third, and by far
most important, of the three Roberts Court decisions dealing with class
certification in fraud-on-the-market cases as the issue of class
certification and “price impact” in the Halliburton litigation returned to
147. See infra text accompanying note 157.
148. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2186-87; see infra text accompanying notes 167-68.
149. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2186-87; see infra text accompanying notes 186-87.
150. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (U.S. 2013).
151. Id. at 1191.
152. See infra text accompanying note 195.
153. See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1204-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1206-16 (Thomas, J.,
joined by Kennedy, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring).
155. Id.
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the Court.
Chief Justice Roberts personally authored the Court’s majority
opinion in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,156 or “Halliburton II,”
which vacated the Fifth Circuit’s decision affirming class certification.157
Writing for a six-justice majority, the Chief Justice rejected both the
defendants’ invitation to overrule Basic,158 and also their suggestion that
plaintiffs should have to affirmatively prove price impact in order to
obtain class certification.159 But the Court also concluded that defendants
are entitled to oppose class certification with evidence showing that their
allegedly misleading statements and omissions did not affect stockmarket prices.160 The Fifth Circuit’s decision affirming class certification
accordingly was vacated so that the defendants could present their
rebuttal evidence on remand.161
As a formal matter, the defendants had won: the class certification
that they opposed was vacated. On this the Court was unanimous,
though Justice Thomas’s opinion “concurring” in a judgment that
vacated class certification did so on a far more radical ground – in an
opinion joined by Justices Scalia and Alito he called for overruling
Basic.162 Moreover, the Court had held that defendants were entitled to
present the very kind of rebuttal evidence that Halliburton I and Amgen
had apparently rejected.163
Yet neither the formality that the plaintiffs “lost,” nor any
qualification of Halliburton I and Amgen’s effect, can obscure the fact
that Halliburton II bodes remarkably well for fraud-on-the-market class
actions. Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court emphatically
reaffirms Basic’s holding,164 which many thought marked for
overruling.165 And it rejects the defendants’ suggestion that plaintiffs
must prove price impact, which still is presumed under Halliburton II,
just as it was under Basic.166 But far more than that, Chief Justice
Roberts’ interpretation of Basic as a decision resting on relatively
modest ideas of market “efficiency” can be expected to have far156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
2014.
166.

Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
Id. at 2417 (“we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals”).
Id. at 2407-13.
Id. at 2413-14.
Id. at 2414-17.
Id. at 2417.
Id. at 2417-27 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.; see infra text accompanying note 193.
Halliburton II, 134 S.Ct. at 2408-13.
See, e.g., Ramzi Abadou, “Fraud on the Market” is Basically Over, DAILY J., Jan. 27,
See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2413-14.
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reaching consequences for securities-fraud litigation, not only at class
certification, but also at other stages of a case, including pleadings
motions, summary-judgment motions, and at trial. And those
consequences are apt, on whole, to be quite favorable to class-action
plaintiffs asserting fraud-on-the-market claims.
A.

Halliburton I

Loss causation is an element that plaintiffs must allege and then
prove in order to establish a § 10(b) claim, as the Supreme Court
unanimously held in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo.167 But in
Halliburton I, the Roberts Court rejected a line of Fifth Circuit decisions
holding that fraud-on-the-market plaintiffs must establish the element of
loss causation to obtain class certification.168
Asserting “that Basic ‘allows each of the circuits to develop its own
fraud-on-the-market rules,’”169 the Fifth Circuit had observed in Oscar
Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom170 that its own
decisions opted “to tighten the requirements for plaintiffs seeking a
presumption of reliance.”171 Oscar then announced: “We now require
more than proof of a material misstatement; we require proof that the
misstatement actually moved the market.”172 “Essentially, we require
plaintiffs to establish loss causation in order to trigger the fraud-on-themarket representation.”173
In Halliburton, a district court bound by the Fifth Circuit precedent
denied class certification solely on the ground that the plaintiffs had
failed to establish loss causation.174 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.175
167. Dura Pharm. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005); see Patrick J. Coughlin, Eric Alan Isaacson
& Joseph D. Daley, What’s Brewing in Dura v. Broudo? The Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Review the
Supreme Court’s Opinion and Its Import for Securities-Fraud Litigation, 37 LOY. U. CH. L. J. 1
(2005).
168. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2183 (U.S. 2011).
169. Oscar Private Equity Inv. v. Allegiance Telecom, 487 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1117-18 (5th Cir. 1988), vacated on other
grounds sub. nom. Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S. 914 (1989)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 264 (citing Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 364 (5th Cir. 1987);
Abell, 858 F.2d at 1120-21; Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 414 (5th Cir. 2001);
Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 2004)); see also Fener v. Operating
Eng’rs, 579 F.3d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 2009).
172. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 265.
173. Id.
174. Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-1152-M,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89598 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2008). Although the district court purported to
rule on loss causation only, its order reads more like one following a bench trial on falsity and
scienter because it construed the Fifth Circuit’s precedent as holding that loss causation requires
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Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the
Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that proof of loss causation may be required
for class certification. “It is undisputed,” the Chief Justice observed,
“that securities fraud plaintiffs must prove certain things in order to
invoke Basic’s presumption of reliance.”176
It is common ground, for example, that plaintiffs must demonstrate
that the alleged misrepresentations were publicly known (else how
would the market take them into account?), that the stock traded in an
efficient market, and that the relevant transaction took place ‘between
the time the representations were made and the time the truth was re177
vealed.

But the Fifth Circuit had conflated loss causation and reliance,
which the Supreme Court held implicated conceptually distinct
concerns: “Loss causation addresses a matter different from whether an
investor relied on a misrepresentation, presumptively, or otherwise,
when buying or selling a stock.”178 “Under Basic’s fraud-on-the-market
doctrine, an investor presumptively relies on defendants’
misrepresentation if ‘information is reflected in [the] market price’ of the
stock at the time of the relevant transaction.”179
“According to the Court of Appeals, however, an inability to prove
loss causation,” in the form of a subsequent decline in the securities
price attributable to the fraud, “would prevent a plaintiff from invoking

demonstrating a price decline on a disclosure of fraud. See id. at *28 (no loss causation where
“nothing in the August 9 disclosure to suggest that [defendants] were lying”); id. at *43 (“The
Plaintiffs must prove that the disclosure actually revealed to the market prior fraud.”); id. at *58
(“Plaintiffs offer no evidence that Halliburton did not believe it was complying with proper
accounting practices.”); id. at *63 (“Since there is no evidence supporting an inference of fraud . . .
the Court will not certify the class . . .”).
175. Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330 (5th Cir.
2010). The Fifth Circuit’s opinion asserts at one point that an investor who purchases a security at
an artificially inflated price was defrauded “if the falsity becomes known and the stock price
declines,” id. at 334, but then states that “the district must decide whether the corrective disclosure
more probably than not shows that the original estimates or predictions were designed to defraud.”
Id. at 338. A footnote adds that while “a plaintiff need not prove at the class certification stage
intentional fraud by the defendant,” nonetheless “we conclude that a plaintiff still must prove that
the defendant is responsible for the error of the misrepresentation.” Id. at 338 n.35. What all this
means, and what it might have to do with loss causation, is anyone’s guess. As the opinion
ultimately was vacated by the Supreme Court, it retains no precedential value. See Cent. Pines Land
Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881, 893-94 n.57 (5th Cir. 2001); Ridley v. McCall, 496 F.2d 213,
214 (5th Cir. 1974) (a vacated opinion “has no precedential value”).
176. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (U.S. 2011).
177. Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 (1988)).
178. Id. at 2186.
179. Id.
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the rebuttable presumption of reliance.”180 “Such a rule,” the Supreme
Court held, “contravenes Basic’s fundamental premise – that an investor
presumptively relies on a misstatement so long as it was reflected in the
market price at the time of the transaction.”181 “Loss causation,” the
Court added, “has no logical connection to the facts necessary to
establish the efficient market predicate to the fraud-on-the-market
theory.”182
The Roberts Court thus overruled the line of Fifth Circuit decisions
requiring plaintiffs to prove loss causation in order to obtain class
certification.183 That clearly was a good result for plaintiffs seeking to
pursue securities-fraud claims on behalf of a class.
Yet, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion was a narrow one, declining to
consider Halliburton’s argument about “price impact.”184 Halliburton’s
alternative theory was that “if a misrepresentation does not affect market
price, an investor cannot be said to have relied on the misrepresentation
merely because he purchased stock at that price. If the price is
unaffected by the fraud, the price does not reflect the fraud.”185
But that theory was one that the Fifth Circuit had not considered. It
had ruled that plaintiffs must show loss causation, “not price impact.”186
Any further arguments that Halliburton had preserved might be
addressed on remand.187
B.

Amgen

Having relieved plaintiffs of the burden of proving loss causation to
obtain class certification, the Roberts Court next rejected contentions
that fraud-on-the-market plaintiffs must establish materiality for a class
to be certified. In Amgen, a six-justice majority including Chief Justice
Roberts concluded that since materiality is an element of liability whose
proof will not vary from one class member to the next, and whose
absence will defeat every class member’s claim, it presents a common
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. The decisions overruled include: Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance
Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 266-70 (5th Cir. 2007); Fener v. Operating Eng’rs Constr. Indus. &
Misc. Pension Fund (Local 66), 579 F.3d 401, 406-10 (5th Cir. 2009); Luskin v. Intervoice-Brite,
Inc., 261 Fed. Appx. 697, 701-02 (5th Cir. 2008). This Article’s author represented the investors on
appeal in Fener.
184. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2187.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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question.
Although Basic presumes price inflation and reliance from
materiality, which a § 10(b) plaintiff ultimately must prove to prevail on
the merits, the Roberts Court held in an opinion by Justice Ginsburg that
“such proof is not a prerequisite to class certification.”188 “Because
materiality is judged according to an objective standard, the materiality
of Amgen’s alleged misrepresentations and omissions is a question
common to all members of the class,” and the “alleged
misrepresentations and omissions, whether material or immaterial,
would be equally so for all investors composing the class.”189 Moreover,
“the plaintiff class’s inability ultimately to prove materiality would not
result in individual questions predominating,” but rather “would end the
case, given that materiality is an essential element of the class members’
securities-fraud claims.”190
Amgen contended that it should at least be able to rebut an
inference of reliance with proof that its statements were not material.
“Because immaterial information, by definition, does not affect market
price,” Justice Ginsburg acknowledged, “it cannot be relied upon
indirectly by investors who, as the fraud-on-the-market-theory presumes,
rely on the market price’s integrity.”191 Thus, as it happens, materiality
sometimes is proved (or disproved) with evidence demonstrating that
allegedly misleading statements and omissions did (or did not) affect a
security’s market price.192
But the district court did not err “by disregarding Amgen’s rebuttal
evidence.”193 For “just as a plaintiff class’s inability to prove materiality
creates no risk that individual issues will predominate, so even a
definitive rebuttal on the issue of materiality would not undermine the
predominance of questions common to the class.”194
Although plaintiffs again had won a class-certification decision
188. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (U.S. 2013).
189. Id.
190. Id.; see Matrixx Initiatives v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (U.S. 2011); Basic, 425
U.S. at 238.
191. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1195.
192. See, e.g., United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 173-74 & nn.29-31 (3d Cir. 2010) (in
criminal prosecution for violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, event study of price movements on
public disclosures is proper evidence of materiality); cf. Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir.
2000) (“the materiality of disclosed information may be measured post hoc by looking to the
movement, in the period immediately following disclosure, of the price of the firm’s stock”); In re
NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1330 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[i]f the disclosure of certain
information has no effect on stock prices, it follows that the information disclosed was immaterial”).
193. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1203.
194. Id. at 1204.
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from a Supreme Court many believed was hostile to class litigation,
three justices dissented from Amgen’s holding that proof of materiality is
neither required nor appropriate at the class-certification stage.195 And
rather ominously, though Justice Alito joined the opinion of the Court,
he nonetheless suggested that “Basic should be reconsidered.”196
Justice Scalia wrote in dissent that the “fraud-on-the-market rule
says that purchase or sale of a security in a well-functioning market
establishes reliance on a material misrepresentation known to the
market.”197 He then declared: “This rule is to be found nowhere in the
United States Code or in the common law of fraud or deception; it was
invented by the Court in Basic v. Levinson.”198
Justice Thomas’s Amgen dissent agreed that “[t]he Basic decision
itself is questionable,” citing Justice White’s Basic dissent.199 “Justice
White’s concerns remain valid today,” Justice Thomas insisted, “but the
Court has not been asked to revisit Basic’s fraud-on-the-market
presumption.”200 Asserting he would “thus limit [his] dissent to
demonstrating that the Court is not following Basic’s dictates,”201 Justice
Thomas nonetheless noted that Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion
“acknowledges there is disagreement as to whether market efficiency is
‘“‘a binary, yes or no question,’”‘ or instead operates differently
depending on the information at issue.”202 He then declared that in Basic
“four Justices of a six-Justice Court created the fraud-on-the-market
presumption from a combination of newly minted economic theories,
and ‘considerations of fairness, public policy, and probability,’ to allow
claims that otherwise would have been barred due to the plaintiffs’
inability to show reliance.”203 Basic had produced “a judicially invented
doctrine based on an economic theory adopted to ease the burden on
plaintiffs bringing claims under an implied cause of action.”204
Justice Alito’s concurring opinion suggested sympathy with the
dissenting justices’ view: “As the dissent observes, more recent evidence
195. See id.. at 1204-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1206-16 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined
by Kennedy, J., and joined by Scalia, J., except for Part I-B).
196. Id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 1205 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 1204.
199. Id. at 1208 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. (quoting footnote 6 of Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion and citing Langevoort,
supra note 61, at 167).
203. Id. at 1212-13 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 25051 n.1 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (citations omitted).
204. Id. at 1213.
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suggests that the presumption may rest on a faulty economic premise.”205
“In light of this development,” Justice Alito concluded, “reconsideration
of the Basic presumption may be appropriate.”206
Plaintiffs had won another Roberts Court class-certification
decision. But it now appeared that at least four justices were prepared to
reconsider, and perhaps overrule, Basic and its fraud-on-the-market
theory of reliance. That, of course, would deal a devastating blow to
open-market securities-fraud class actions.
C.

Halliburton II

On remand from the Court’s decision in Halliburton I, defendants
had presented the same evidence that they had earlier said disproved loss
causation, recharacterizing it now as evidence unhinged from common
elements of liability such as materiality or loss causation. Rather, they
said, they now meant for it only to show that their misrepresentations
had “no price impact,” rather than to disprove loss causation (barred by
Halliburton I) or materiality (barred by Amgen). The district court on
remand rejected the defendants’ attempt at a second bite from what
appeared to be the same apple.207 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.208
The defendants then petitioned for certiorari, asking the Supreme
Court to reconsider and overrule Basic or, failing that, to require
plaintiffs to present evidence affirmatively demonstrating price impact
as a prerequisite to class certification.209 With the Supreme Court’s grant
of certiorari, some of my colleagues in the plaintiffs’ class-action bar
feared Basic was doomed.210
Given Amgen’s dissenting opinions and Justice Alito’s rather
ambidextrous concurrence, Basic appeared vulnerable to overruling.
Commentators often had discounted Justice Blackmun’s opinion, joined
by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, by describing it as a mere
“plurality” opinion rather than as a fully binding opinion of the Court.211
205. Id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Langevoort, supra note 61, at 175-76).
206. Id.
207. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV1152-M, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24823 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2012).
208. See supra text accompanying note 175.
209. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds,
133 S. Ct. 1184 (U.S. 2013), 2012 WL 707042.
210. See, e.g., Abadou, supra note 165.
211. See, e.g., Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral
Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 457 & 465 n.28 (2006) (chiding “the Court’s plurality” for
“relying on a theory that had not yet gone through as much academic give and take” and
characterizing Justice Blackmun’s opinion as “the decision for the plurality”); Paul A. Ferrillo,
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So, too, had some lower courts.212 Compared to the current lineup on the
Roberts Court, moreover, Basic’s supposed “plurality” appeared to be a
dubiously liberal one: Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens. Their ruling’s authority seemed undermined by
the fact that Justice White and Justice O’Connor had dissented, while the
Court’s remaining conservatives, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia,
and Justice Kennedy, did not participate in the decision. Had those three
participated, might the decision have come out the other way?
Yet as six justices constitute a quorum of the Court, Justice
Blackmun’s opinion for four of the six-justice quorum in fact constituted
a binding majority “opinion of the Court”213 that had been in place more
than a quarter century. And the Roberts Court proved loathe to overrule
such a precedent.
Chief Justice Roberts himself wrote the opinion of the Court
reaffirming Basic. “Before overturning a long-settled precedent,” the
Frederick C. Dunbar & David Tabak, The “Less Than” Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis:
Requiring More Proof from Plaintiffs in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 84
(“this article discusses the plurality and dissenting opinions in Basic”); William O. Fisher, Does the
Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 848 & n.2
(2005) (asserting “a plurality of the Supreme Court ruled that, at least under certain circumstances,
plaintiffs in 10b-5 securities cases may invoke ‘a rebuttable presumption of reliance, supported in
part by the fraud-on-the-market theory’ (FOTM)” and noting that “Justice White, joined by Justice
O’Connor, filed an opinion dissenting from the portion of the plurality decision addressing the
FOTM issues”); Carden, supra note 124, at 886 (“Numerous writers have noted the link between the
plurality opinion in Basic and the semi-strong ECMH.”); Joseph De Simone, Note, Should Fraud on
the Market Theory Extend to the Context of Newly Issued Securities?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 151,
165 (1993) (“Justice Blackmun could muster only a plurality for the Court’s resolution of the issue
of reliance and the fraud on the market theory.”); Andrew R. Simmonds, Kenneth A. Sagat &
Joshua Ronen, Dealing with Anomalies, Confusion and Contradiction in Fraud on the Market
Securities Class Actions, 81 KY. L.J. 123, 124 n.3 (1993) (“For the plurality of the Court, the
existence of an efficient market justified a presumption of reliance . . . .”); Jennifer H. Arlen &
William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992
U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 698 n.34 (1992) (“The plurality opinion in Basic cited empirical studies
suggesting that ‘the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly
available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.’”); Ayres, supra note 124, at
983 (discussing “Justice Harry Blackmun’s plurality opinion”).
212. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech. Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1354 (N.D. Cal. 1994); In re
Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Jaroslawicz v. Engelhard Corp., 724
F. Supp. 294, 299-300 (D.N.J. 1989).
213. SUP. CT. R. 4.2 (“Six Members of the Court constitute a quorum.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)
(“The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the united States and
eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.”); see Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1192
n.1 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities
Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 892 n.138 (1992) (“Some have
characterized the decision as a plurality holding. That characterization is not accurate, however,
since the decision was made by a majority of those sitting; it is thus an opinion of the Court with
stare decisis effect.”).
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Chief Justice explained, “we require ‘special justification,’ not just an
argument that the precedent was wrongly decided.”214 “According to
Halliburton,” the Chief Justice observed, “the Basic presumption
contravenes congressional intent and has been undermined by
subsequent developments in economic theory.”215 “Neither argument,
however, so discredits Basic as to constitute ‘special justification’ for
overruling the decision.”216
Halliburton argued that § 10(b)’s closest analog is 1934 Act §
18(a), “which creates an express private cause of action allowing
investors to recover damages based on misrepresentations made in
certain regulatory filings,” but which “requires an investor to prove that
he bought or sold stock ‘in reliance upon’ the defendant’s
misrepresentation”; the plaintiff, on the other hand, insisted that “the
closest analogue to section 10(b) is not section 18(a) but section 9, a
provision that does not require actual reliance.”217 “We need not settle
this dispute,” the Chief Justice asserted, for “[i]n Basic, the dissenting
justices made the same argument based on section 18(a).”218 “The Basic
majority did not find that argument persuasive then, and Halliburton has
given us no new reason to endorse it now.”219
Justice White’s Basic dissent also had charged that Justice
Blackmun’s opinion rested upon newfangled economic theory – the
relatively recently framed “Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis.”220
Halliburton insisted “that the Basic Court espoused ‘a robust view of
market efficiency’ that is no longer tenable, for ‘“overwhelming
empirical evidence” now “suggests that capital markets are not
fundamentally efficient.”’”221 Chief Justice Roberts’ rejection of this
contention will have important consequences.
The Chief Justice observed that “Halliburton focuses on the debate
among economists about the degree to which the market price of a
company’s stock reflects public information about that company – and
thus the degree to which an investor can earn an abnormal above-market

214. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (U.S. 2014) (quoting Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
215. Id. at 2408.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2409 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2012)).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250-51 (1988) (White, J., dissenting).
221. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2409 (quoting Brief for Petitioners 14-16 (quoting Baruch
Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: a Legal, Economic, and
Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV 7, 20 (1994))).
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return by trading on such information.”222 Such “criticisms fail to take
Basic on its own terms,” the Chief Justice observed, explaining that the
financial economists’ “debate is not new. Indeed, the Basic Court
acknowledged it and declined to enter the fray, declaring that ‘[w]e need
not determine by adjudication what economists and social scientists have
debated through the use of sophisticated statistical analysis and the
application of economic theory.’”223
“The markets for some securities are more efficient than the
markets for others,” the Chief Justice acknowledged, “and even a single
market can process different kinds of information more or less
efficiently, depending on how widely the information is disseminated
and how easily it is understood.”224 But Basic itself said that to recognize
a presumption of reliance “was not conclusively to adopt any particular
theory of how quickly and completely publicly available information is
reflected in market price.”225 “The Court instead based the presumption
on the fairly modest premise that market professionals generally
consider most publicly announced material statements about companies,
thereby affecting stock market prices.”226 “Basic’s presumption of
reliance thus does not rest on a ‘binary’ view of market efficiency.
Indeed, in making the presumption rebuttable, Basic recognizes that
market efficiency is a matter of degree and accordingly made it a matter
of proof.”227
Thus, Chief Justice Roberts concluded for the Court, “academic
debates” about market efficiency “have not refuted the modest premise
underlying the presumption of reliance” that open and developed
markets tend to respond to public information.228 “Even the foremost
critics of the efficient-capital-markets hypothesis acknowledge that
public information generally affects stock prices.”229 “Debates about the
precise degree to which stock prices accurately reflect public
information are thus largely beside the point.”230
As for contentions that so-called “value investors” do not rely on
market price when, acting on the belief “that certain stocks are
222. Id. at 2410.
223. Id. (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47 n.24).
224. Id. at 2409.
225. Id. at 2410 (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 n.28).
226. Id. (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 n.24).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. (citing Robert Shiller, Sharing Nobel Honors, and Agree to Disagree, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2013, at BU6 (“Of course, prices reflect available information.”)).
230. Id.
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undervalued or overvalued,” they try “to ‘beat the market’ by buying
undervalued stocks and selling overvalued ones,’”231 Chief Justice
Roberts declared:
Such an investor implicitly relies on the fact that a stock’s market price
will eventually reflect material information – how else could the market correction on which his profit depends occur? To be sure, the value
investor “does not believe that the market price accurately reflects public information at the time he transacts.” But to indirectly rely on a
misstatement in the sense relevant for the Basic presumption, he need
only trade stock based on the belief that the market price will incorporate public information within a reasonable stock period. The value investor also presumably tries to estimate how undervalued or overvalued a particular stock is, and such estimates can be skewed by a market
232
price tainted by fraud.

Halliburton asked the Roberts Court, if it would not overrule Basic
in whole, at least to require plaintiffs to do more than show that
allegedly misleading statements were disseminated in an efficient
market, by demanding further evidence demonstrating that the
statements moved the stock’s price. Justice Roberts’ opinion for the
Court in Halliburton II flatly rejects defense contentions that plaintiffs
should be required “to prove that a defendants’ misrepresentation
actually affected the stock price – so-called ‘price impact’ – in order to
invoke the Basic presumption.”233 Such a requirement, the Chief Justice
explained, would amount to overruling of Basic’s holding that “if a
plaintiff shows that the defendants’ misrepresentation was public and
material and that the stock traded in a generally efficient market, he is
entitled to a presumption that the misrepresentation affected the stock
price.”234 Basic remained binding: “For the same reasons we declined to
completely jettison the Basic presumption, we decline to effectively
jettison half of it, by revising the prerequisites for invoking it.”235
This left Halliburton’s last-ditch argument – that fraud-on-themarket defendants should at least be permitted “to rebut the presumption
of reliance with evidence of a lack of price impact, not only at the merits
stage . . . but also before class certification.”236 On remand from
Halliburton I, the lower courts had concluded that the Supreme Court
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id. at 2411 (quoting Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 2413.
Id. at 2414.
Id.
Id. at 2413.
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was not particularly friendly to defendants’ attempts to oppose class
certification with evidentiary showings of this sort. When the
Halliburton defendants sought on remand to present the very same
evidence that the Supreme Court had rejected – the second time through
as evidence of “no price impact” unhinged from elements such as loss
causation and materiality – the district court considered this an obvious
attempt to make the very same showing that the Supreme Court had
rejected in Halliburton I.237 And with the Roberts Court’s further
opinion in Amgen, denying defendants the opportunity to oppose class
certification with evidence that statements were not material (which
could well include evidence that they had no impact on the stock market)
the Fifth Circuit naturally affirmed.238
Yet in Halliburton II, the Supreme Court held that these rulings
were wrong: “Defendants must be afforded an opportunity before class
certification to defeat the presumption through evidence that an alleged
misstatement did not affect the market price of the stock.”239
Naysayers might assert that this undoes the holdings of both
Halliburton I and Amgen by permitting defendants to oppose class
certification with essentially the very kind of evidentiary showing that
Halliburton I and Amgen foreclosed. In Halliburton I, the Court ruled
that the defendants could not oppose class certification with evidence
that they said disproved loss causation because alleged misstatements
did not move Halliburton’s stock price.240 And Amgen held that
defendants may not oppose class certification by disproving materiality
– which typically would be done with evidence showing that alleged
misstatements and omissions had no effect on market price.241 But
Halliburton II holds that defendants can oppose class certification with
such evidence.
Yet, by relieving plaintiffs of the burden of proving price impact,
and requiring defendants to demonstrate absence of price impact,
Halliburton II clearly favors plaintiffs at class certification. And by
acknowledging that markets may respond to information at variable
rates, Halliburton II dramatically shifts the field in plaintiffs’ favor by
making efficiency issues questions of fact, ill-suited to disposal as a
matter of law on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. This is
237. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV1152-M, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24823, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2012).
238. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423, 432-35 (5th Cir. 2013).
239. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2417.
240. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185-87 (U.S. 2011).
241. Amgen v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (U.S. 2013).
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critically important to the litigation of open-market securities-fraud
claims.242
Before turning to the majority opinion’s implications, however, it is
worth addressing Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion joined by
Justices Breyer and Sotomayor. “Advancing price impact consideration
from the merits stage to the certification stage may broaden the scope of
discovery available at certification,” Justice Ginsburg wrote for three
justices of the six-justice majority.243 This may open the door to
discovery, for example, of internal corporate communications
concerning the company’s stock price – for we know that corporate
executives and their investment-relations staff care very much about
what moves the company’s stock price, and that they often will discuss
the subject in internal memoranda and emails. Justice Ginsburg also
underscored the majority’s holding that “it is incumbent upon the
defendant to show the absence of price impact,” leaving no doubt that
defendants seeking to rebut Basic’s inference of price inflation and
reliance bear the burden of proof and persuasion.244
With plaintiffs afforded the discovery to which they are entitled,
and the burden of proving the absence of price impact placed squarely
on defendants’ shoulders, the concurring opinion concluded, Halliburton
II “should pose no heavy toll on securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable
claims.”245 “On that understanding,” Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor joined the opinion of the six-justice majority.246
VI. WHAT HALLIBURTON II MEANS FOR SECURITIES-FRAUD CLASS
ACTIONS
Halliburton II is good news for plaintiffs prosecuting securitiesfraud class actions. All doubts concerning the fraud-on-the-market
theory’s continuing viability have been removed by the Roberts Court’s
reaffirmation of a controversial four-justice majority opinion in Basic. In
addition, the degree of efficiency that plaintiffs must establish has been
considerably relaxed from that which some lower courts had demanded.
By rejecting the notion that efficiency is a “binary, yes or no,” all-ornothing-proposition, Halliburton II overturns decisions requiring
plaintiffs to establish almost perfect efficiency and undermines decisions

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

See supra text accompanying notes 228-30.
Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2417 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss4/8

38

Isaacson: Securities Class Action

2015]

SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS

961

disposing of plaintiffs’ claims as a matter of law because the market did
not react swiftly enough.247
By holding that Basic rests upon a flexible idea of “market
efficiency,” rather than upon extreme ECMH definitions underlying
financial economists’ technical tests of efficiency – as lawyers,
commentators, and even some lower courts often assumed – Halliburton
II severely undermines, and probably overrules, decisions employing
extreme notions of “efficiency” to deny class certification, to dismiss
securities-fraud claims on the pleadings, or to enter summary judgment
for defendants. This is very good news for investors seeking class relief
in fraud-on-the-market cases.248
Lower courts’ decisions requiring plaintiffs to prove conformity
with rigid ideas of “efficiency” associated with ECMH clearly are
inconsistent with Halliburton II’s much looser notion of market
efficiency – under which it is enough that markets eventually tend to
reflect new information, even if they do so neither immediately nor
completely.249
Lower courts’ decisions applying extreme assumptions about
market efficiency to dismiss fraud-on-the-market claims as a matter of
law at the pleadings stage should fall before Halliburton II’s much more
flexible concept of efficiency. These include precedents holding, as a
matter of law, that fraud-on-the-market claims may be dismissed
whenever information was publicly available and the market price did
not instantaneously respond. Under Halliburton II’s approach to
efficiency, price effects ultimately are questions of fact ill-suited to
determination as a matter of law. Halliburton II’s recognition that the
market for a given security may be quite efficient with respect to some
disclosures, but less so with respect to others, should preclude disposing
of claims as a matter of law.250
Lower courts’ decisions rejecting fraud-on-the-market claims with
respect to initial public offerings also conflict with Halliburton II’s
rather lenient concept of market efficiency which, as it happens,
comports with the understanding of the Congress that framed the
securities laws. The 73rd United States Congress clearly expected that
information in an initial public offering’s registration statement and
prospectus would determine a new issue’s price in the market.251
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
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By endorsing a flexible concept of efficiency, under which markets
need not immediately incorporate all new information, Halliburton II
should also undermine expectations that plaintiffs should submit
sophisticated multiple-variate regression analyses focusing on
statistically significant price movements, on pain of losing their claims
for failure to produce such evidence.252
Finally, by placing squarely on defendants’ shoulders the burden of
disproving price effects when securities trade actively in an open-anddeveloped market, the Roberts Court has upended lower-court decisions
throwing out plaintiffs’ fraud-on-the-market cases on account of socalled “confounding factors,” where a security’s price moved
significantly on simultaneous public disclosure of more than one piece
of news. Any difficulties posed by dealing with such factors are now
problems not for plaintiffs, but for defendants trying to shoulder their
burden of disproving price impact.253
A.Halliburton II Overrules Decisions Employing Rigid Notions of
Market Efficiency
To illustrate how favorable Halliburton II is to class-action
plaintiffs asserting open-market securities-fraud claims, consider its
impact on the First Circuit and district court decisions in In re
PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.,254 which Professor Langevoort sharply
criticized in his 2009 article, Basic at Twenty.255
In the PolyMedica litigation, district Judge Robert E. Keaton had
certified a class, noting the parties’ disagreement about what is required
for a securities market to qualify as “efficient.”256 The plaintiff thought it
enough that “the stock price was affected by the material information
available in the market,” while the defendants insisted that the market
price must “reflect all the news about the company or industry” so
quickly and completely that “it is no longer possible to generate
arbitrage profits.”257
Judge Keaton concluded that the fraud-on-the-market theory did not
require a market where prices nearly instantaneously reflect all publicly
available material information, but merely one in which, quoting Basic,
252. See supra text accompanying notes 228-30.
253. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413 (U.S. 2014).
254. Bowe v. PolyMedica Corp. (In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 432 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
2005), on remand 453 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Mass 2006).
255. See Langevoort, supra note 61, at 172 & n.94 (2009).
256. In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 224 F.R.D. 27, 39 (D. Mass. 2004).
257. Id. at 40.
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“‘market professionals generally consider most publicly announced
material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market
prices.’”258 This definition, Judge Keaton acknowledged, “differs from
the definition of an ‘efficient’ market as an economic term of art,” under
which “‘prices at any time fully reflect “all available information,’” so
that publicly “available information does not support profitable trading
strategies or arbitrage opportunities.”259 Judge Keaton acknowledged
that “the definition I have derived from Basic differs from much of the
existing case law,” which often tracked the academic notion that all
information must be completely reflected in price at all times for a
securities market to be deemed “efficient.”260
On an interlocutory class-certification appeal, the First Circuit
rejected Judge Keaton’s view, instead embracing “the prevailing
definition of market efficiency,” under which “an efficient market is one
in which market price fully reflects all publicly available
information.”261 This, it said, was the definition “adopted by many lower
courts as a prerequisite for applying the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance.”262
Although Judge Keaton had quoted Basic itself for his more lenient
standard, the First Circuit noted a Third Circuit decision that Basic
favorably cited also included a footnote asserting that “the ‘fraud on the
market’ theory rests on the assumption that there is a nearly perfect
market in information, and that the market price of stock reacts to and
reflects the available information.”263 Moreover, lower-court decisions
issued after Basic had “overwhelmingly” favored a definition of
efficiency requiring all information to be fully reflected in price at all
times.264 “By rejecting the prevailing definition of market efficiency”
and by “focusing instead on the general consideration by market
professionals of most publicly announced material statements about
companies, the district court applied the wrong standard of efficiency,”
the First Circuit concluded.265 It held “an efficient market is one in
which the market price of the stock fully reflects all publicly available
258. Id. at 41 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 n.24 (1988)).
259. Id. (quoting Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 119, at 554-55.
260. Id. at 42.
261. Bowe v. PolyMedica Corp. (In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 432 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.
2005) (citing Stout, supra note 132, at 639; Fama, supra note 110, at 383).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 11-12 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 n.10 (3d Cir. 1986)) (emphasis
added).
264. Id. at 12-13 (collecting cases).
265. Id. at 14.
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information.”266
Under this definition, the First Circuit explained, prices must
“‘respond so quickly to new information that it is impossible for traders
to make trading profits on the basis of that information.’”267 A court’s
“focus” in ruling on class certification thus must be “on whether a
particular market has absorbed all available information (and
misinformation), such that an ordinary investor cannot beat the market
by taking advantage of unexploited profit opportunities.”268 To be clear:
“By ‘fully reflect,’ we mean that market price responds so quickly to
new information that ordinary investors cannot make trading profits on
the basis of such information.”269
Applying a more lenient test, the district court had ignored
defendant PolyMedica’ s proffered evidence that an expert witness’s
“serial correlation test” and “put-call parity test” showed potential for
profit by trading on publicly available data about PolyMedica – thereby
suggesting less-than-perfect efficiency.270 The district court’s task on
remand would be to consider that evidence in light of the proper test.271
With Judge Keaton’s retirement, that task fell to the district court’s
chief judge, the Honorable William G. Young, who concluded that the
evidence successfully rebutted the stock market’s efficiency.272 “It is
difficult to accept that a stock with an average weekly trading volume of
over 4,000,000 shares would not have impounded news quickly,” Chief
Judge Young acknowledged.273 But the First Circuit had adopted an
extreme definition of efficiency.
Chief Judge Young accepted the defendants’ contention that
although PolyMedica stock was actively traded, strict efficiency was
lacking in light of three factors. First, there were “constraints” on short
selling.274 Second, “violations of put-call parity” might have permitted
investors with the means and know-how to earn risk-free profits by
trading put and call options.275 And third, an expert running a regression
analysis could find positive “serial correlations” or price trends during

266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id.
Id. (quoting Stout, supra note 132, at 651).
Id. at 16.
Id.at 19.
Id. at 18 & n.21.
See id.
PolyMedica, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
Id. at 270-71.
Id. at 273-74.
Id. at 274-76.
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the class period.276
It is far from clear that any of this should have been sufficient to
disprove efficiency even by financial academics’ rigorous standards. If
short sales were outlawed altogether, actively traded securities prices
still would be set by supply and demand informed by publicly available
information. Moreover, the defendants’ evidence that short selling was
“constrained” rather paradoxically consisted of data showing that many
people were in fact doing it: “Compared to the NASDAQ short interest
average of less than 2%, the percentage of PolyMedica shares
outstanding represented by the short interest rose from 7.8% at the end
of 2000 to 66% in April 2001.”277 That much short selling, the
defendants’ expert reasoned, must have made additional short selling
somewhat more difficult.278 The district court agreed, holding that
although short selling may have only incremental price effects, “low or
nonexistent barriers to short selling are nonetheless essential to
information efficiency.”279
Chief Judge Young’s reliance on expert testimony concerning
investors’ alleged opportunity to earn risk-free profits by trading in the
derivative securities called “put options” and “call options” also was
doubtful. The First Circuit had defended efficiency in terms of whether
“ordinary investors” could profitably trade on the basis of public
information, not whether a financial economist could do so.280 Neither
constraints on short sales nor esoteric arbitrage opportunities should
have mattered much, for they did not show that ordinary investors could
have profited by trading on public information about PolyMedica.
PolyMedica’s expert also asserted that efficiency of the market for
PolyMedica stock was contradicted by the presence of “serial
correlations” during part of the class period – which means simply that
past movement in stock price may have had some predictive value with
276. Id. at 276-78.
277. Id. at 273.
278. See id.
279. Id. at 275 n.18.
280. See Bowe v. PolyMedica Corp. (In re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 432 F.3d 1, 19 (1st
Cir. 2005) (“[A]n efficient market is one in which the market price fully reflects all publicly
available information. By ‘fully reflect,’ we mean that market price responds so quickly to new
information that ordinary investors cannot make trading profits on the basis of such information.”).
The First Circuit itself held in Stuebler v. Xcelera.com that even if “the presence of irrational
investors and limits to arbitrage which prevented market price from reflecting fundamental value –
may have been ‘relevant to the extent it raises questions about informational efficiency,’ the district
court did not err in finding ‘other more accessible and manageable evidence’ sufficient to establish
the presumption of reliance.” Stuebler v. Xcelera.com (In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig.), 430 F.3d 503,
518 (1st Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
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respect to future movement of the stock’s price. The expert did not
explain how investors could have known this at the time, of course, and
other decisions have held (even before Halliburton II) that “the presence
of serial correlation is not itself determinative of inefficiency.”281 The
financial economist whose name is most closely associated with
efficient-capital-market theory, Professor Fama himself, had warned that
where “statistically significant evidence for dependence in successive
price changes or returns has been found,” this generally “does not appear
to be sufficient to declare the market inefficient” and “does not seem of
sufficient importance to warrant rejection of the efficient markets
model.”282 It is, after all, notoriously easy with hindsight to identify
technical trading strategies that would have produced profits during any
particular historical period. Fama himself reportedly identified many, but
with a caveat: “The various strategies Fama developed seemed to work
very well in back testing on past data, but failed when subjected to outof-sample tests.”283 Science is about replicable results, not post hoc
“data mining.”
Chief Judge Young in any event credited PolyMedica’s expert
testimony concerning serial correlations during part of the putative class
period as evidence that PolyMedica stock “did not ‘quickly’ and ‘fully’
respond to material information.”284
Such holdings cannot survive Halliburton II, which clearly
overrules the First Circuit’s rigid definition of market efficiency.
Halliburton’s arguments “focus[ed] on the debate among economists
about the degree to which the market price of a company’s stock reflects
public information – the degree to which an investor can earn abnormal,
above-market return by trading on such information.”285 But Halliburton

281. In re Countrywide, 273 F.R.D. 586,615 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see also, e.g., In re Computer
Sci. Corp. Sec. Litig., 288 F.R.D. 112, 121 & n.9 (E.D. Va. 2012); In re NetBank, 259 F.R.D. 656,
675 (N.D. Ga. 2009); In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196, 213 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Plumbers &
Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund v. Burns, 967 F. Supp. 2d, 1143, 1160 (N.D. Ohio 2013).
282. Fama, supra note 110, at 414; see Computer Sci., 288 F.R.D. at 121 n.9. A leading
treatise similarly dismisses the importance of “serial correlation over short horizons,” because the
correlation coefficients “tend to be fairly small, at least for large stocks for which price data are the
most reliably up-to-date,” so that while “studies demonstrate weak price trends over short periods,
the evidence does not clearly suggest the existence of trading opportunities,” let alone meaningful
departures from market efficiency. ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 359
(8th ed. 2009). The treatise’s authors “conclude that markets are very efficient,” despite such minor
anomalies. Id. at 375.
283. COLIN READ, THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESISTS: BACHELIER, SAMUELSON, FAMA,
ROSS, TOBIN, AND SHILLER 96 (2012).
284. PolyMedica, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
285. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2410 (U.S. 2014).
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II holds that Basic “instead based the presumption on the fairly modest
premise that ‘market professionals generally consider most publicly
announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock
prices.’”286
B.

Halliburton II Overrules Decisions Assuming that the Market
Prices Immediately and Completely Incorporate All Available
Information

Some courts have held that because the efficient-market hypothesis
supposes all information is instantaneously reflected in stock price,
investors’ claims may be dismissed on the pleadings if accurate
information was available from any source before otherwise misleading
public statements were made. Other decisions hold that any substantial
delay in the market’s response to a disclosure is fatal to plaintiff
investors’ claims.
The poster child for this approach would be Merck & Co., Inc. Sec.
Litig.,287 which dismissed claims where the Wall Street Journal’s
analysis of the company’s financial reports triggered a significant drop
in Merck’s stock price.288 But the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal on the
pleadings because the Wall Street Journal’s analysis was based on
documents that had been available for a month and that upon disclosure
had triggered no stock drop.289 The Third Circuit flatly rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument that in Basic “the Supreme Court declined to resolve
‘how quickly and completely publicly available information is reflected
in market price.’”290 For “our Court has resolved how ‘quickly and
completely’ public information is absorbed into a firm’s stock price. We
have decided that this absorption occurs ‘in the period immediately
following disclosure.’”291
A more recent example would be Meyer v. Greene, which sustained
a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on the pleadings where a stock’s price fell in
response to a short seller’s public explanation that a company’s realestate assets were impaired, because “efficient market theory . . . posits
that all publicly available information about a security is reflected in the
market price.”292 The Eleventh Circuit explained, “any information
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
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Id.
In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261, 270-71 (3d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 268-69.
Id. at 269-71.
Id. at 269.
Id. (quoting Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1197, 1201-02 (11th Cir. 2013).
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released to the public is immediately digested and incorporated into the
price.”293 But the short seller had managed to figure out the issuer’s
fraud from publicly available sources. This the court deemed “fatal to
the [i]nvestors claims.”294 “The efficient market theory,” it explained, “is
a Delphic sword: it cuts both ways.”295 “Either the market is efficient or
it is not.”296
This is the “binary” view rejected by Halliburton II, utterly at odds
with the Supreme Court’s observation that markets may absorb some
kinds of disclosures more rapidly than others.297
These decisions assume that all publicly available disclosures of all
sorts will be immediately digested and reflected in stock price. That
assumption is no longer tenable after Halliburton II: “The markets for
some securities are more efficient than markets for others, and even a
single market can process different kinds of information more or less
efficiently, depending on how widely the information is disseminated
and how easily it is understood.”298
C.

Halliburton II Casts Doubt on the Continuing Validity of Decisions
Withholding the Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption in Cases
Involving Initial Public Offerings

Although Congress clearly assumed that information in a new
security’s registration statement would determine its price,299 several
lower-court decisions, both before and after Basic, have flatly rejected
the notion that the market for an initial public offering (“IPO”) could be
“efficient” in the sense that prices would in fact reflect information in
the security’s offering documents.
Prior to Basic, the Fifth Circuit had applied a presumption of
reliance to a new offering of municipal bonds in Shores v. Sklar300 on the
theory that absent false statements the securities could not have been
sold. The Fifth Circuit’s “fraud-created-the-market” opinion faced
withering criticism, however, from commentators who insisted that a
new issue’s price is set not by market forces, but by the new securities’

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1198.
Id.
Id.
Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2409 (U.S. 2014).
Id.
See H.R. REP. NO. 85, at10 (1933).
Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981).
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issuer and underwriters.301 Other courts endorsed their view. The
Eleventh Circuit declared in dictum that “in the case of new securities,
the price will be set by the offeror and underwriters, not the market.”302
The Third Circuit said that while a presumption of reliance on material
misstatements “is plausible in developed markets, it may not be in the
case of newly issued stock.”303
After Basic was decided, the academic commentary and courts
continued to assert that a presumption of reliance has no place in cases
involving a new issue of securities. Commentators insisted that with
Basic’s supposed adoption of ECMH, one could not presume false
statements affect a new issue’s price because a new issue, by definition,
is not yet actively traded.304 The Sixth Circuit declared that “[a] primary
market for newly issued [securities] is not efficient or developed under
any definition of these terms.”305 The Second Circuit agreed that “the
market for IPO shares is not efficient.”306 And many district court
decisions concluded the same.307
These decisions are clearly at odds with the 73rd Congress’
understanding of how securities markets work. In contrast with 1934 Act
§ 10(b) claims, 1933 Act § 11 initially required no proof of reliance
precisely because it may be assumed that the new issue’s price is based
on information in its registration statement. The 1933 Act’s legislative

301. See Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1156-58 (1982);
Black, supra note 122, at 453.
302. Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 746 (11th Cir. 1984).
303. Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 n.10 (3d Cir. 1986).
304. See, e.g., De Simone, supra note 211, at 5176-77; Robert G. Newkirk, Sufficient
Efficiency: Fraud on the Market in the Initial Public Offering Context, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1393,
1394 (1991).
305. Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation
marks omitted); accord Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1994) (“This
Circuit has held that the fraud on the market presumption of reliance does not apply when securities
are not traded on an efficient market, as is the case with new issues.”).
306. See, e.g., Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig.), 471 F.3d
24, 42 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1129 (7th Cir. 1993)
(no fraud-on-the-market presumption for IPO of securities for which “[n]o trading market
developed” even after the IPO).
307. Danis v. USN Commc’ns, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 391, 397 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (“no market exists at
the time of the initial public offering”); Berwecky v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 197 F.R.D. 65, 68 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“in an IPO there is no well-developed market in the offered securities”); Degulis
v. LXR Biotechnology, 176 F.R.D. 123, 126 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“some courts have held that the
presumption may not apply in cases involving IPO’s – such as this one – because in the IPO setting,
there is no well-developed, efficient trading market” (dictum)); Gruber v. PriceWaterhouse, 776 F.
Supp. 1044, 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (“the ‘fraud on the market’ theory cannot apply to initial public
offerings”); Masri v. Wakefield, 106 F.R.D. 322, 324-25 (D. Colo. 1984) (holding fraud-on-themarket presumption inapplicable to an initial public offering).
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history indicates that Congress dispensed with requiring proof of
reliance on the understanding that the representations in a new issue’s
registration statement and prospectus,
although they may never actually have been seen by the prospective
purchaser, because of their wide dissemination, determine the market
price of the security, which in the last analysis reflects those manifold
causes that are the impelling motive of the particular purchase. The
connection between the statements made and the purchase of the security is clear, and, for this reason, it is the essence of fairness to insist
upon the assumption of responsibility for the making of these state308
ments.

Contemporaneous commentary explained that “the registration
statement will be an important conditioner of the market” so that a
purchaser in the open market “may be as much affected by
misstatements as if he had read and understood the statement.”309
Congress returned to the issue of reliance for § 11 claims with the
1934 Act’s amendment inserting a new reliance requirement for some,
but not all, § 11 claimants. Those staking § 11 claims to a new issue’s
registration statement would have to show reliance only if they
“acquired the security after the issuer has made generally available to its
security holders an earning statement covering a period of at least twelve
months after the effective date of the registration statement.”310 Even
then, the amendment to § 11 specified “such reliance may be established
without proof of the reading of the registration statement.”311
The Conference Report explained that while it could be assumed
that statements in offering documents initially determined a new
security’s price, where an intervening twelve months of financial results
have been released, the assumption is no longer warranted, and proof of
a lingering effect should be required.312
308. H.R. REP. NO. 85, at 10 (1933).
309. William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE
L.J. 171, 176 (1933).
310. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
311. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 206(a), 48 Stat. 907, amending Securities Act of 1933
§ 11(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)) (emphasis added), states:
If such person acquired the security after the issuer has made generally available to its
security holders an earning statement covering a period of at least twelve months beginning after the effective date of the registration statement, then the right of recovery under
this subsection shall be conditioned on proof that such person acquired the security relying upon such untrue statement in the registration statement or relying upon the registration statement and not knowing of such omission, but such reliance may be established
without proof of the reading of the registration statement by such person.
312. As the Conference Report put it:
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If § 11’s text and history thus show that Congress expected offering
documents’ statements and omissions to determine a new security’s
market price, on which it believed investors should be able to rely, it is
hard to see how courts may legitimately refuse to apply a fraud-on-themarket presumption to § 10(b) claims asserted in connection with an
initial public offering. The Supreme Court held in Herman & MacLean
v. Huddleston313 that § 11 and § 10(b) provide cumulative remedies and
that investors may seek relief under § 10(b) if a registration statement
covered by § 11 was fraudulently misleading.314 Investors might wish to
do so for a variety of reasons, including the much longer limitations
period for securities-fraud claims under § 10(b)315 and differences in the
calculation of recoverable damages.316
The notion expressed by commentators and courts that an initial
public offering’s price is arbitrarily set by the issuer and its underwriters
without reference to market forces, never was terribly plausible. The
United States has a well-developed market for initial public offerings.
The purchasers generally are sophisticated institutional investors, the
very sort of market professionals that Basic counted on to “consider
most publicly announced material statements” about companies in which
they invest, “thereby affecting stock prices.”317 And while the issuer and
Section 11(a) is amended so as to require proof that the purchaser of a security at the
time he acquired the security, relied upon the untrue statement in the registration statement or upon the registration statement and did not know of the omission. But this requirement is imposed only in the case of purchase after a period of 12 months subsequent to the effective registration date and then only when the issuer shall have
published an earning statement to its security holders covering a period of at least 12
months after the registration date. The basis of this provision is that in all likelihood the
purchase and price of the security purchased after publication of such an earning statement will be predicated on that statement rather than upon the information disclosed upon registration.
H.R. REP. NO. 1838, at 41 (1934) (Conf. Rep.).
313. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
314. Id. at 379-88.
315. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012) (providing a limitations period of one year after
discovery should have been made in the exercise of reasonable diligence, and repose period of
“three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public” for § 11 claims) with 28 U.S.C. §
1658(b) (2012) (providing a limitations period of “2 years after the discovery of facts constituting
the violation” and a repose period of “5 years after such violation”).
316. Section 11 caps recoverable damages as “the difference between the amount paid for the
security (not exceeding the price at which the security was offered to the public)” and either the
“value thereof as of the time . . . suit was brought” or the price at which the claimant sold it. 15
U.S.C. § 77k(e). Thus, if a § 11 plaintiff acquired the security in the open market at a price higher
than the offering price, § 10(b) damages may be substantially larger than § 11 damages.
317. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 n.24 (1988); see generally Lawrence M.
Benveniste & Paul A. Spindt, How Investment Bankers Determine the Offer Price and Allocation of
New Issues, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 343 (1989).
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underwriter typically set an anticipated “price range,” many offerings
actually price above or below this range, based on the institutional
investors’ response and as “bids are submitted to the bookrunner who
constructs a demand curve for the issue.”318 Some offerings are
postponed or cancelled “due to market conditions.”319
With Halliburton’s clear adoption of a lenient standard of
efficiency, there no longer is any basis for refusing to apply Basic’s
presumption to IPOs.
D.

Halliburton II Overrules Decision Demanding that Plaintiffs
Produce Event Studies

Also doubtful after Halliburton II are lower-court decisions
requiring plaintiffs to come forward with a sophisticated econometric
multivariate regression analysis or “event study” to demonstrate market
efficiency of an actively traded and widely followed security.
In his article, Basic at Twenty, Professor Langevoort observed that
“wading into the mind numbing data defendants (and thus plaintiffs as
well) often put forward in their expert reports, creates the illusion that
there is a bright-line distinction among different issuers,” reinforcing
assumptions that efficiency is “a binary, yes or no question.”320 With
Halliburton II’s holding that Basic’s presumption of reliance “does not
rest on a ‘binary’ view of market efficiency,”321 but applies even if the
market takes a while to digest some information, such mind-numbing
statistical analysis is largely beside the point. This is for the better and
surely comports with the legislative understanding of the 73rd Congress.
Though Congress clearly contemplated that false statements may
affect market prices, providing relief in § 9, for example, an investor
“who shall purchase or sell a security at a price which was affected,”322
318. Tim Jenkinson, Alan D. Morrison, & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Why are European IPOs
So Rarely Priced Outside the Indicative Price Range, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 186 (2005); see id. at
185-86 (noting that “in around one-half of US IPOs the final price is set outside the initial price
range”).
319. See, e.g., News Release, LipoScience, Inc., LipoScience Postpones Initial Public Offering
Due to Market Conditions (Sept. 25, 2002), available at PR NEWSWIRE,
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/liposcience-postpones-initial-public-offering-due-tomarket-conditions-75914657.html (“LipoScience, Inc. announced today that it has postponed its
Initial Public Offering due to market conditions.”); cf. In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d
261, 265 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Merck announced the postponement of the Medco IPO and indicated that
it would drop Medco’s offering price”; “later, Merck announced it would postpone the Medco IPO
indefinitely”).
320. Langevoort, supra note 61, at 167-68.
321. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2410 (U.S. 2014).
322. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f) (2012).
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it surely did not contemplate that sophisticated statistical regressions
should be required to prove a case. The earliest reference to regression
analysis that I have found in reported state or federal decisions is Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes,323 a 1969 order in an antitrust case that
quoted an expert witness on “regression analysis” merely to demonstrate
how extraordinarily complicated the matter was – setting it apart from
ordinary litigation.324 Not until the mid-1970s did Supreme Court
decisions first refer to “regression analysis”325 or “multivariate
analysis,”326 and then only in dissenting opinions.
Congress could not have expected such evidence to be required
when it enacted the federal securities laws in the 1930s, even though
both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act clearly assume that litigants will
present proof of price effects. Congress gave defendants subject to
liability under 1933 Act § 11 the opportunity to reduce damages by
showing that the decline in the securities price was due to factors other
than its registration statements’ misleading statements and omissions.327
And it provided in § 9 an express remedy in permitting investors who
acquire a security at a price manipulated by certain deceptive statements
or actions to recover damages.328
With Halliburton II’s return to the more flexible notions of market
323. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), later opinion,
312 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), modified on appeal, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev’d sub nom.
Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
324. Id. at 685 n.2. The Supreme Court ultimately directed that the case be dismissed on the
ground that the alleged antitrust violations were authorized by the Civil Aeronautics Board under
the Federal Aviation Act and thus immune from antitrust liability. Hughes Tool Co., 409 U.S. 363.
325. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184 (1976) (“Statistical attempts to evaluate the worth
of the death penalty as a deterrent to crimes by potential offenders have occasioned a great deal of
debate. The results simply have been inconclusive.”); see also id. at 235-36 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing regression analysis concerning whether the death penalty has any deterrent effect).
326. Aberdeen & R. R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
422 U.S. 289, 329-30 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
327. Section 11 of the 1933 Act presumes that a registration statement’s misleading statements
and omissions would affect a new security’s price and awarded as presumptive damages the
difference between the price paid for a registered security (not to exceed its offering price) and
either its price on the date of suit or the price at which the plaintiff sold the security: “Provided, that
if the defendant proves that any portion or all of such damages represents other than the
depreciation in value of such security resulting from such part of the registration statement, with
respect to which his liability is asserted, not being true or omitting to state a material fact required to
be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, such portion of all such
damages shall not be recoverable.” 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2012).
328. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(f) (2012) (“Any person who willfully participates in any act or
transaction in violation of subsection (d), (b), or (c) of this section, shall be liable to any person who
shall purchase or sell any security at a price which was affected by such act or transaction, and the
person so injured may sue in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the damages sustained
as a result of any such act or transaction.”).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

51

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 8

974

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:923

efficiency familiar to the enacting Congress, decisions that fault
plaintiffs for failure to present detailed statistical models should fall by
the wayside.
E. HALLIBURTON II UPENDS CASES HOLDING PLAINTIFFS’ SHOWINGS
FRUSTRATED BY “CONFOUNDING FACTORS”
Some lower courts, and the Fifth Circuit in particular, have trashed
plaintiffs’ cases on account of so-called “confounding factors” where a
security’s price moves upon the simultaneous disclosure of multiple bits
of information, not all of them related to a fraud.
In the very decision that Halliburton I reversed, the Fifth Circuit
had faulted the plaintiffs because Halliburton, a defendant, had included
“three different pieces of information in the [press] release” that
triggered a stock sell off.329 Similarly, in Fener v. Operating
Engineers,330 the Fifth Circuit faulted plaintiffs’ case, and affirmed
denial of class certification, because the defendants’ press release that
triggered a stock sell-off “contained not one piece of information, but
three separate pieces of news.”331 Quite recently the First Circuit held in
Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse Secs.
(USA) LLC332 that the plaintiffs’ expert’s failure to account for
“confounding factors” meant plaintiffs had no evidence of loss causation
and that “[s]ummary judgment was therefore properly awarded to the
defendants.”333 The message seemed clear: issuers may commit
securities fraud with impunity merely by ensuring that any fraudulent
statements they make are accompanied by statements on other subjects
and that any revelation of the true state of affairs is mixed up with
further disclosures designed to “confound” investors relying on Basic’s
fraud-on-the-market presumption.
These decisions, which can be traced back to the now-overruled
Fifth Circuit’s holding in Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance
Telecom, Inc.,334 cannot survive Halliburton II. By casting on defendants
the burden of disproving price impact, Halliburton II rather clearly shifts

329. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d 330, 342
(5th Cir. 2010).
330. Fener v. Operating Eng’rs, 579 F.3d 401 (5th Cir. 2009). This Article’s author
represented the plaintiffs-appellants in Fener.
331. Id. at 408.
332. Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse Sec., 752 F.3d 82 (1st
Cir. 2014).
333. Id. at 84.
334. Oscar Private Equity Inv. v. Allegiance Telecom, 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007).
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from plaintiffs to defendants the risk of uncertainty produced by
“confounding factors.” As Judge Dennis’s trenchant Oscar dissent
observed, Oscar “attempts to recharacterize the Basic presumption as a
sort of ‘bursting bubble’ presumption” that “‘disappears if anything to
the contrary is placed before the Court.’”335 Under such a view, “the
Basic presumption evaporates as soon as a defendant simply introduces a
mere possibility the defendant’s material misrepresentation might not
have affected the market price.”336
The “bursting bubble” approach is contrary, of course, to the
Federal Rules of Evidence’s treatment of presumptions. The Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 301 explains that evidentiary presumptions
“place upon the opposing party the burden of establishing the
nonexistence of the presumed fact, once the party invoking the
presumption establishes the basic facts giving rise to it.”337
Defendants should have little hope of Oscar’s “bursting bubble”
conception of Basic’s presumption. Basic itself embraced no burstingbubble analysis.338 To the contrary, Basic states that the defendants rebut
the presumption not merely by producing some evidence of their own,
but only if with it they “could show . . . that the market price could not
have been affected by their representations.”339 As Judge Dennis’s Oscar
dissent observed, “Basic thus clearly places the burdens of both
producing evidence and persuasion on the defendant and requires an
actual showing that the defendant’s misrepresentation did not, or could
not have, affected the market price of the stock.”340 The great weight of
precedential authority has long agreed.341 Halliburton II now confirms
335. Id. at 274 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Zavala, 443 F.3d 1165, 1169
(9th Cir. 2006)).
336. Id.
337. FED. R. EVID. 301 advisory committee’s note (“the so-called ‘bursting bubble’ theory,
under which a presumption vanishes upon the introduction of evidence which would support a
finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact is rejected as according presumptions too ‘slight
and evanescent’ an effect.”).
338. See Steven Serajeddini, Note, Loss Causation and Class Certification, 108 MICH. L. REV.
255, 266-67 (2009) (“There is no indication that the Basic court intended to adopt the burstingbubble approach.”); see also Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1291 (D.N.J. 1989) (applying
Basic and rejecting “bursting bubble approach” “under which a presumption vanishes upon the
introduction of evidence which would support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed facts”).
339. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988) (emphasis added).
340. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 274 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
341. See, e.g., Millowitz v. Citigroup Global Mkts., (Inc.) (In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia
Litig.), 544 F.3d 474, 485 (2d Cir. 2008) (defendants “bore the burden of showing that market price
was not affected”); Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Basic,
485 U.S. at 248) (emphasis added) (the “presumption of reliance in a fraud-on-the-market case may
be rebutted by proving that ‘the “market makers” were privy to the truth’”); Semerenko v. Cendent
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that Basic “affords defendants the opportunity to rebut the presumption
by showing, among other things, that the particular misrepresentation at
issue did not affect the stock’s market price.”342
This view is consistent with the rule of Story Parchment, which the
Roberts Court’s Comcast decision made a point of citing with
approval.343 With wrongdoing established, “the risk of uncertainty
should be thrown upon the wrongdoer instead of upon the injured
party.”344 If defendants are shown to have committed securities fraud by
making materially misleading statements with fraudulent intent, they
cannot be permitted to avoid liability by mixing things up with
disclosures on multiple issues.
This view also is consistent with how courts have long treated the
presumption of reliance from materiality that the Supreme Court
endorsed in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.345 Thus, where
omissions caused an opinion letter to be materially misleading, the Third
Circuit held in Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand,346 the burden of proof at
trial properly rested upon the defendants.347 The Second Circuit held
similarly in duPont v. Brady,348 that “once the plaintiff establishes the
materiality of the omission by a preponderance of the evidence, the
burden shifts to the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff did not rely on the omission in making the
Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 179 (3d Cir. 2000) (“the presumption of reliance may be rebutted by showing
that the market did not respond”); Peil v. Speiser, 806 F. 2d 1154, 1161-62 n.11 (3d Cir. 1986)
(finding it “sensible to shift the burden of disproving reliance to the defendants”); Fine v. Am. Solar
King, 919 F.2d 290, 299 (5th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added) (“The presumption of reliance can be
rebutted by showing . . . that the non-disclosures did not affect the market price. . . .”); see also
Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1120 (5th Cir. 1988) (Basic “shift[s] the burden of
persuasion, as to reliance, onto securities fraud defendants”); In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 274
F.R.D. 480, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that they satisfy
each element of the Basic presumption . . . Defendants bear the burden of rebutting the presumption
by a preponderance of the evidence”); Pa. Ave. Funds v. Inyx Inc., No. 08 Civ. 6857 (PKC), 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72999, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2011) (“Once a plaintiff establishes that the
fraud-on-the-market presumption applies, defendants bear the burden of rebutting the presumption
by a preponderance of the evidence”); Steiner v. Southmark Corp., 734 F. Supp. 269, 277 n.6 (N.D.
Tex. 1990) (“the fraud-on-the-market presumption is rebuttable, and serves only to shift to the
defendant the burden of persuasion as to reliance.”).
342. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2414 (U.S. 2014) (emphasis added); accord id. at 2417
(“it is incumbent upon the defendant to show the absence of price impact”) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
343. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433 (U.S. 2013); see supra text
accompanying notes 17-19.
344. Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
345. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. Utah, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
346. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 188-89 (3d Cir. 1981).
347. Id. at 188-89.
348. duPont v. Brady, 828 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1987).
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investment decision.”349 The great weight of authority agrees that proof
of materiality “shifts the burden of persuasion on the issue of
reliance.”350 “It is thus the defendant who must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence” that a material omission had no effect.351
CONCLUSION
The Roberts Court is by no means as hostile to class actions as
some may believe. Without doubt, the Court’s decisions in cases
concerning arbitration clauses are apt to frustrate the pursuit of justice by
consumers and others bound by contracts of adhesion. But in other
respects the Court’s class-action jurisprudence can be quite favorable to
class litigation.
The Court’s recent decisions concerning certification of openmarket securities-fraud claims are particularly favorable. With its
decisions in Halliburton I and Amgen, the Roberts Court has relieved
plaintiffs in fraud-on-the-market case of the burdens, imposed by lower
courts, of demonstrating loss causation and materiality in order to obtain
class certification. Most significantly, with Halliburton II, the Court
both preserved and restored vitality to the fraud-on-the-market
presumption recognized by four liberal justices in Basic, soundly
rejecting contentions that the controversial decision should be overruled
– and doing so with an opinion apt to curtail lower courts’ inclination to
interpret and apply the concept of market efficiency with a case-killing
vengeance. With Halliburton II’s rejection of rigid binary notions of
efficiency, courts no longer will be able to dispose of cases as a matter
of law on the rationale that market prices did not react quickly enough or
by assuming that those prices incorporated all information immediately.
For securities-fraud class-action plaintiffs, at least, the Roberts
Court’s decisions have been a blessing.

349. Id. at 76; accord, e.g., Burke v. Jacoby, 981 F.2d 1372, 1379 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Smith
Barney Transfer Agent Litig., 290 F.R.D. 42, 48-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Grossman v. Waste Mgmt.
Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395, 400 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
350. duPont, 828 F.2d at 78 (citing Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1200 (7th Cir.
1985); Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1978); Chelsea Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d
1266, 1271-72 (6th Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1973)).
351. Id.
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